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UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS 
Susannah W. Pollvogt* 
 
It is well established that animus can never constitute a legitimate state 
interest for purposes of equal protection analysis.  But neither precedent 
nor scholarship has stated conclusively how animus is properly defined, 
what counts as evidence of animus in any given case, or the precise 
doctrinal significance of a finding of animus.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
explicitly addressed the question of animus only a handful of times, and 
these cases do not appear to be particularly congruent with one another, at 
least on the surface.  Further, while a number of scholars have discussed 
animus in terms of moral philosophy, no one has attempted to articulate a 
unified theory of animus as a matter of doctrine—particularly in the post-
Lawrence era.   
This Article systematically examines Supreme Court precedent to distill a 
coherent standard for identifying the presence of animus in various forms of 
state action.  What emerges is that the animus analysis the Court actually 
employs provides a more vigorous alternative to the thoroughly criticized 
“tiers-of-scrutiny” framework, which has defined and limited the scope of 
contemporary equal protection jurisprudence.  In short, the doctrine of 
unconstitutional animus gives life to the strong anti-caste mandate of the 
federal Equal Protection Clause.  The time is ripe to understand the nature 
of unconstitutional animus, as animus may well play a critical role in the 
Court’s decisions on the constitutionality of different forms of prohibitions 
against same-sex marriage. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Article is to advance a comprehensive understanding 
of unconstitutional animus as the U.S. Supreme Court uses the concept in 
its federal equal protection jurisprudence.  While the Article will ultimately 
develop a broader definition of the term, as a point of reference, it is useful 
to start with the Court’s initial articulation of animus as “a bare . . . desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group.”1  The Court has held on numerous 
occasions that where a law is based on such animus, it will not survive even 
the most deferential level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.2  
In short, animus, including hostility toward a particular social group, is 
never a valid basis for legislation or other state action. 
Thus, although the concept of unconstitutional animus rarely appears in 
the Court’s decisions, it is powerful when it does.  This is because under 
contemporary equal protection jurisprudence, nearly all claims are subject 
 
 1. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).  As discussed below, “a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” is a species of animus, but does not 
represent animus in its entirety. See infra notes 76, 113, 230 and accompanying text. 
 2. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
473 U.S. 432 (1985); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 2012] UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS 889 
to deferential rational basis review.  Under rational basis review, the 
plaintiff almost invariably loses.  Proving that a law is based on 
unconstitutional animus is virtually the only way an equal protection 
plaintiff can prevail under this deferential and increasingly common 
standard.  Further, a plaintiff can prevail by showing animus without having 
to prove that she is a member of a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  So while 
the Court has discerned the presence of unconstitutional animus on only a 
few occasions, when animus is found, it functions as a doctrinal silver 
bullet. 
For this and other reasons, it is not surprising that the Ninth Circuit relied 
on the concept of unconstitutional animus in striking down California’s 
Proposition 8 earlier this year in Perry v. Brown.3  First, the federal district 
court decision that the Ninth Circuit was reviewing relied on the concept of 
animus.4  Second, and more significantly, the concept of unconstitutional 
animus cuts a short and direct path through the morass that is contemporary 
equal protection jurisprudence.  Relying on animus allowed the Ninth 
Circuit to avoid difficult and unpleasant doctrinal questions.5  Further, the 
underlying facts in Perry actually presented an easy case for identifying 
unconstitutional animus and striking the law on that basis—although the 
Ninth Circuit did not take the easy route to its conclusion.  Specifically, 
 
 3. 671 F.3d 1052, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’g Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-144 (U.S. July 30, 2012) (noting that 
Proposition 8 gave rise to an inference “that the disadvantage imposed [on plaintiffs was] 
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 633–34 (1996))); see also id. at 1096.  In brief, Proposition 8 was a law enacted by 
popular referendum in the State of California that withdrew from same-sex couples the right 
to marry—a right that had previously been granted to them by virtue of the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008) (holding 
that marriage must be made available to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples). 
 4. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2010): 
Many of the purported interests identified by proponents are nothing more than a 
fear or unarticulated dislike of same-sex couples.  Those interests that are 
legitimate are unrelated to the classification drawn by Proposition 8 . . . .  In the 
absence of a rational basis, what remains of proponents’ case is an inference, 
amply supported by evidence in the record, that Proposition 8 was premised on the 
belief that same-sex couples simply are not as good as opposite-sex couples. 
See also id. (“Whether that belief is based on moral disapproval of homosexuality, animus 
towards gays and lesbians or simply a belief that a relationship between a man and a woman 
is inherently better than a relationship between two men or two women, this belief is not a 
proper basis on which to legislate.”). 
 5. Namely, whether:  (1) bans on same-sex marriage discriminate on the basis of sex; 
(2) bans on same-sex marriage discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation; (3) sexual 
orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification; and/or (4) bans on same-sex marriage 
implicate the recognized fundamental right to marriage, such that the Court’s holding in 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), would control.  If any of these questions were 
answered in the affirmative, the court would have been obligated to apply some form of 
heightened scrutiny to Proposition 8. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432, 440 (1985) (noting that suspect classifications receive strict scrutiny); Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982) (noting that laws implicating fundamental rights are subject to 
strict scrutiny). 
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precedent clearly demonstrates that the Supreme Court is willing to find 
that a law violates the Equal Protection Clause where statements 
surrounding the enactment of the law indicate that it was motivated by 
private bias against an unpopular group.  Such evidence was in ample 
supply in Perry, where proponents of Proposition 8 had a lengthy record of 
antigay sentiments meant to stir support for the measure.  But for reasons 
this Article will explore later, the Ninth Circuit did not make this evidence 
the centerpiece of its analysis.6 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reached the correct outcome in Perry and 
hung its analysis on the correct doctrinal hook:  unconstitutional animus.  
But the court did not draw on the full history of the doctrine in reaching its 
conclusion.  Rather, it offered a rather cabined view of animus, informed 
largely by the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans.7  While 
Romer is the most recent of the Court’s recognized animus decisions, it is 
also the least helpful and most compromised. 
Romer is not a model of doctrinal clarity,8 and when one looks at the 
other cases addressing unconstitutional animus, the picture does not 
necessarily become clearer.9  Because while the Supreme Court has clearly 
stated that the federal Equal Protection Clause does not permit state action 
based on animus toward a particular social group,10 the Court has not 
clearly defined the concept of animus, stated what exactly counts as 
evidence of animus, or identified the doctrinal significance of finding the 
presence of animus in any given case.  Indeed, the Court has addressed the 
concept of animus only a handful of times, and these cases do not appear to 
be particularly congruent with one another—at least at first blush.  This 
Article contends that there is a single, unifying doctrinal principle running 
through the Supreme Court’s animus cases, but it takes some work to 
identify that principle. 
 
 6. See infra notes 294–95 and accompanying text. 
 7. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that Colorado’s Amendment 2 violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because it lacked a rational basis independent of unconstitutional animus). 
 8. See Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL 
OF RTS. J 89, 90–91 (1997) (compiling various, divergent interpretations of Romer v. Evans); 
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 55 (1996) 
(noting that one of the virtues of the Romer decision was that it left certain controversial 
issues undecided). 
 9. See Nan Hunter, Animus Thick and Thin, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 111 (2012), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/64-SLRO-111.pdf 
(characterizing the concept of animus as “highly contested ground”). 
 10. See id. at 632 (holding Amendment 2 unconstitutional because it “seems 
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship 
to legitimate state interests”); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47 (noting that the desire to 
harm persons with cognitive disabilities is not a legitimate state interest); Palmore v. Sidoti, 
466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984) (noting that the law may not directly or indirectly give effect to 
personal biases); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (noting that 
the desire to harm a politically unpopular group such as hippies is not a legitimate public 
interest). 
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Further, while there was a flurry of commentary on animus immediately 
following the Court’s decision in Romer, there has not been an effort to 
comprehensively reassess the doctrine of unconstitutional animus since the 
Court decided Lawrence v. Texas11 in 2003.  And indeed, much of the 
scholarly commentary on animus post-Romer was understandably 
preoccupied with the question Justice Scalia raised forcefully in his dissent:  
whether moral disapproval and unconstitutional animus were really the 
same thing.12  But after Lawrence, it is clear that bare moral disapproval of 
homosexual conduct or homosexual identity is not a valid basis for a law.13 
Because the doctrine of unconstitutional animus goes well beyond 
Romer, this Article seeks to set forth the full scope of the Court’s animus 
jurisprudence in the context of claims brought under the federal Equal 
Protection Clause.  This inquiry is timely because a full understanding of 
unconstitutional animus may be necessary for the Supreme Court’s review 
of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry if the Court accepts certiorari.  
Further, the concept of animus may also be central to other same-sex 
marriage cases.  As of this writing, the Court has not yet decided whether to 
grant certiorari review in Perry or any of the pending challenges to the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).  If the Court issues certiorari in 
one or more of these cases this term, the issue of animus will be before it 
sooner rather than later.  But the Court may well deny certiorari for now to 
allow further development of the law in the lower courts.  In this case, the 
lower courts will have to grapple with the animus doctrine in the absence of 
further guidance from the Supreme Court, creating a more elaborate—and 
 
 11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding Texas anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional). 
 12. See Barbara J. Flagg, “Animus” and Moral Disapproval:  A Comment on Romer v. 
Evans, 82 MINN. L. REV. 833 (1998) (asking whether moral disapproval is a constitutionally 
adequate state interest); Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth:  Romer v. Evans and 
the Politics of Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REV. 453, 492‒500 (1997) (describing the 
Supreme Court’s use of animus in its analysis in Romer, Moreno, and Cleburne, and 
concluding that the underlying rationale is that laws will be invalidated if they are based on 
or reflective of the view that some people are intrinsically worth less than others); S.I. 
Strong, Justice Scalia as a Modern Lord Devlin:  Animus and Civil Burdens in Romer v. 
Evans, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1997) (examining theoretical basis for permitting moral 
disapproval as a basis for law); see also Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious 
Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 90–91 (1997) (cataloging theories of animus 
disseminated in the wake of the Romer decision). 
 13. Indeed, Justice Scalia vigorously argued in his dissent in Romer that Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), stood for precisely this proposition, that laws could and 
should express bare moral disapproval of otherwise innocuous conduct and bare moral 
disapproval of groups associated with that conduct: 
In holding that homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the 
Court contradicts a decision, unchallenged here, pronounced only 10 years ago . . . 
and places the prestige of this institution behind the proposition that opposition to 
homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias.  Whether it is or not is 
precisely the cultural debate that gave rise to the Colorado constitutional 
amendment (and to the preferential laws against which the amendment was 
directed). 
Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. 186). 
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possibly more confusing—backdrop for the Court’s ultimate resolution of 
the animus doctrine.  
Now that Lawrence has resolved the doctrinal ambiguity that plagued 
Romer, and marriage equality litigation is looming on the horizon of the 
Supreme Court’s docket, it is the right time to revisit unconstitutional 
animus—the conceptual linchpin of the Romer decision.  To help further 
understand the doctrine of unconstitutional animus in the post-Lawrence 
world, Part I of this Article explains the significance of animus in the larger 
context of trends in contemporary equal protection jurisprudence.  Part II 
closely examines decisions of the Supreme Court that rely on the concept of 
animus.  Part III identifies the common themes running through these 
somewhat disparate decisions, and presents an overarching definition for 
unconstitutional animus, a taxonomy of the types of evidence that can be 
used to establish the existence of animus, and an internally consistent 
account of the doctrinal significance of a finding of animus.  Part IV 
critically examines the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of animus in Perry 
against the backdrop this Article develops. 
I.  THE DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ANIMUS 
Animus can be considered the sleeper agent of the Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence:  it rarely makes an appearance—but when it does, 
it swiftly and effectively accomplishes its mission. 
One reason animus is important is because there is good reason to believe 
it may play a central role in the Court’s decision(s) on marriage equality.  
But there are other reasons to be interested in the Court’s understanding of 
animus outside of the role the doctrine may play in same-sex marriage 
litigation.  First, demonstrating that a law is based on unconstitutional 
animus is virtually the only way a plaintiff is successful under deferential 
rational basis review.  This matters, in turn, because most contemporary 
equal protection claims will receive rational basis review rather than any 
form of heightened scrutiny.  Second, while animus has played its largest 
role in rational-basis cases, it also is relevant to cases where heightened 
scrutiny is applied.  This is because the doctrine of unconstitutional animus 
expresses core values of the federal Equal Protection Clause that transcend 
the Court’s rigid tiers-of-scrutiny framework. 
A.  The Tiers-of-Scrutiny Framework 
The doctrinal significance of animus has everything to do with the ways 
in which contemporary equal protection analysis has evolved.  Thus, a brief 
history of the Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny framework for equal protection cases 
provides necessary context for understanding the doctrinal significance of 
animus.  In the beginning, there was only one standard of judicial scrutiny 
in equal protection cases:  a rule of reason.  For example, the Court applied 
 2012] UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS 893 
a “reasonableness” test in the early (and since reviled) case of Plessy v. 
Ferguson.14  In deciding whether mandatory racial segregation of passenger 
train cars violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court determined that 
laws relying on racial classifications need only be “reasonable” regulations 
within the state’s police power.15  The reasonableness inquiry, in turn, was 
essentially backward-looking:  “In determining the question of 
reasonableness [the legislature] is at liberty to act with reference to the 
established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to 
the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and 
good order.”16  Viewed in this light, race segregation was eminently—
indeed, undeniably—“reasonable.”17 
As the Plessy decision aptly demonstrates, relying on a rule of reason—
“with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the 
people”18—to assess the fairness of a particular mode of discrimination is 
inherently problematic.  This is because a standard based on reasonableness, 
“common knowledge,” or otherwise by reference to subjective, 
contemporary standards of fairness will be ineffective at rooting out 
contemporary prejudices, which, by definition, conform with contemporary 
custom and reason.  While we hope that governmental decision makers, 
including judges, can rise above commonly held biases, there is good 
reason to think they cannot.19 
But rather than developing a mechanism to carefully root out biased 
thinking, the Court instead developed a short cut through critical thought.  
In essence, the Court created categories of cases in which there was 
presumptive concern that unfair prejudice was afoot.  In this subset of 
cases, the Court would apply heightened judicial scrutiny.  The framework 
that ultimately evolved, through fits and starts, required race-based laws to 
survive “searching judicial scrutiny,”20 under which the state must show 
that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
 
 14. 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), abrogated by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (holding racially segregated train cars constitutional under the “separate but equal” 
doctrine). 
 15. See id. (“[T]he case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is 
a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion 
on the part of the legislature.”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 550–51. 
 18. Id. at 550. 
 19. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“Americans share a 
common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays a 
dominant role.  Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, 
attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individual’s race and induce negative 
feelings and opinions about nonwhites.  To the extent that this cultural belief system has 
influenced all of us, we are all racists.  At the same time, most of us are unaware of our 
racism.”). 
 20. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (noting that 
“searching judicial scrutiny” is reserved for laws involving suspect classifications). 
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interest.21  This standard is famously difficult to meet, and indeed, outside 
of laws meant to ameliorate the effects of race discrimination,22 one no 
longer sees laws relying on explicit (i.e., facial) race classifications.23 
There are several justifications for departing from the deference and 
presumption of constitutionality in race-based cases.  First, the explicit, 
historical purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to eliminate post-
slavery race discrimination.24  While the Court determined that the 
provision did not empower Congress to enact broad antidiscrimination 
legislation,25 it did empower the courts to patrol state laws for 
impermissible racial bias.26  Thus, the default of extreme judicial deference 
to state legislatures based on a commitment to separation of powers was not 
required where the Constitution itself mandated a departure from this 
standard.  Notably, because the Court applies strict scrutiny to all race-
based classifications,27 not just those related to American slavery, the 
 
 21. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 22. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) 
(reviewing constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policy aimed at increasing 
educational diversity). 
 23. Instead, race-based equal protection jurisprudence has largely been displaced onto 
the decidedly more treacherous terrain of discriminatory impact cases.  In these cases, the 
challenged law does not contain a facial race classification, but is claimed to have a 
discriminatory impact along racial lines.  The discriminatory racial impact is insufficient to 
trigger strict scrutiny; rather, the plaintiff must prove that the law was enacted with 
discriminatory intent—a notoriously difficult showing. See Mario L. Barnes & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 
1081–83 (2011) (noting that the limited types of evidence available to establish 
discriminatory intent, along with the tiers of scrutiny, leave courts severely limited in their 
ability to deal with racial inequalities). 
 24. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71, 81 (1872) (asserting that 
the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was the “firm establishment of that freedom [of 
the black race], and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the 
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him” and 
declaring that the “evil to be remedied” by promulgation of the Equal Protection Clause was 
that evil caused by those laws “which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against 
[emancipated slaves] as a class”). 
 25. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13–14 (1883) (“[T]he legislation which 
Congress is authorized to adopt in this behalf is not general legislation upon the rights of the 
citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for 
counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and which, by the Amendment, 
they are prohibited from making or enforcing, or such acts and proceedings as the States may 
commit or take, and which, by the Amendment, they are prohibited from committing or 
taking.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1967) (noting that, even where subject 
matter of legislation falls within a state’s police powers, the courts will still review the 
legislation for compliance with the Equal Protection Clause). 
 27. The Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), recognized the 
danger of racial antagonism underlying all racial classifications: 
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil 
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.  That is not to say that 
[they are] unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject them to the most 
rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of 
such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.  
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justification for elevated scrutiny in such cases goes beyond its historical 
grounding.  The application of strict scrutiny to racial classifications reflects 
a broader consensus that one’s race is never relevant to one’s ability to 
participate in society, such that race is almost never a valid subject of 
legislative action.28 
From this initial departure, the Court eventually developed an elaborate 
tiers-of-scrutiny framework for determining the proper level of judicial 
review in any given case.  The first instance where departure from rational 
basis review is permitted is that described above—where a law relies on a 
problematic classification.  Race is the paradigmatic problematic 
classification, and has been designated by the Court—along with alienage 
and national origin—as a “suspect classification.”  The traits defining these 
classifications are presumptively irrelevant to lawmaking.  These 
classifications are “suspect” in the sense that we are suspicious when a law 
relies on them, because they tend to represent misplaced prejudice or 
antipathy toward the named group rather than a basis for sound legislative 
judgment.29  Therefore, laws or other state action relying on suspect 
classifications will be subject to strict scrutiny, to make certain that 
decision-makers do not unconsciously succumb to the “reasonableness” of 
racial prejudice. 
Intermediate scrutiny applies to laws relying on the two so-called “quasi-
suspect classifications”:  gender and illegitimacy.30  The notion here is that 
while race, for example, is almost never a valid basis for legislation, gender 
is generally not a valid basis—but there are exceptions, due to the “real 
differences” between men and women.31  Courts must be careful that 
gender classifications are not based on unfair prejudice, but such 
 
Id. at 216. 
 28. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (“[T]wo members of this Court have already stated 
that they ‘cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color of a 
person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense.’”) (quoting McLaughlin 
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring)). Contra 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), abrogated by Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (determining that race was relevant to government regulation of public 
transportation, education, marriage, and general “preservation of the public peace and good 
order”). 
 29. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (stating that suspect 
classifications are “more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than 
legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective”).  For further explanation, see 
Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 38–42 (2010). 
 30. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985).  In 
conjunction with the decisions identifying suspect and quasi-suspect classifications, the 
Court has developed an elaborate analysis for determining whether any particular 
classification falls into one of these categories.  Suffice it to say that the Court went through 
a period of expanding the number of recognized suspect and quasi-suspect classifications, 
but has declined to do so since 1977. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 747, 756–57 (2011). 
 31. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“Physical differences between 
men and women, however, are enduring . . . .”). 
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classifications may be permissible under the right circumstances.  Laws 
relying on quasi-suspect classifications provoke intermediate scrutiny, 
which places the burden on the state to prove that the law is justified by an 
“important” governmental interest and that the classification is 
“substantially related” to advancing that interest.32 
The second instance where the Court will depart from rational basis 
review is where a law relies on any classifications of persons to regulate 
access to a fundamental right.33  In such cases, strict scrutiny applies 
regardless of whether the classification at issue is suspect or not—elevated 
scrutiny is triggered by the nature of the right at issue rather than the nature 
of the classification.  The idea here is that, regardless of whether the group 
discriminated against has been historically disadvantaged or marginalized, 
there are certain rights that are so important to our lives in a free society 
that access to these rights should not be regulated on a differential basis. 
In contemporary equal protection jurisprudence, rational basis review 
remains as the lowest level of judicial scrutiny and is the default standard.  
Under this level of scrutiny, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the 
absence of any legitimate governmental interest served by the law.34  
Further, the law’s means need only be rationally related to accomplishing 
that end—the fact that a classification is over- or underinclusive is not a 
winning argument under rational basis review.35  Courts apply rational basis 
review to a range of cases, from those involving discrimination between 
economic interests36 to those involving discrimination on the basis of some 
trait that, in contrast to race, is seen as presumptively relevant to 
performance in society and is therefore a valid basis for legislation.37 
Thus, the Court’s interpretations of history, social reality, and our values 
as a society determine which types of discrimination are of concern and 
 
 32. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. 
 33. See id. at 440. 
 34. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (Under rational basis review, “[a] 
statute is presumed constitutional, and ‘[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative 
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it’” (second alteration 
in original) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973))). 
 35. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 55 (“But this does not doom a statute under rational 
basis review; over-inclusive and under-inclusive legislation is perfectly acceptable, indeed 
quite common.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLITICS 668–69, 721–28 (3d ed. 2006). 
 36. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107 (2003) (subjecting 
an Iowa law to rational basis review, where the law distinguished for tax purposes among 
revenues obtained within the State by two enterprises conducting business in the State). 
 37. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (noting that age has not been recognized as a suspect 
classification because the aged had not been “subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of 
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities” (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. 
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976))); see also Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect 
Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 165–67 (2011) (noting that courts consider the 
relevancy of a group’s defining characteristic in terms of determining whether the 
differentiating trait bears a relation to the individual’s ability to participate and contribute to 
society). 
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which are not.  And these various levels of concern are then expressed in 
the deep structures of the equal protection doctrine. 
Scholars have criticized the rigid tiers-of-scrutiny framework as a barrier 
rather than facilitator of antidiscrimination imperatives.38  First, the tiers-of-
scrutiny framework operates as an outcome matrix,39 thereby short-
circuiting rather than deepening substantive inquiry into the fairness of any 
particular form of discrimination.40  And indeed, one sees a pattern in equal 
protection decisions where much time and attention is paid to determining 
the applicable level of judicial scrutiny; once this question is answered, the 
analysis proceeds succinctly and superficially.  If the Court rejects 
arguments that the plaintiff is a member of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, 
or that the law interferes with a fundamental right, it will settle on rational 
basis review and the plaintiff will lose.41  But if the Court is persuaded of 
either of these two prerequisites, it will apply heightened scrutiny and likely 
strike the challenged law. 
The difficulty of succeeding under rational basis review is exacerbated by 
the fact that the vast majority of contemporary equal protection cases are 
assessed under this deferential standard.  Access to heightened scrutiny is 
generally foreclosed, as the Court has expressed great reluctance to 
acknowledge new suspect classifications, quasi-suspect classifications, or 
fundamental rights.42  Kenji Yoshino argues persuasively that this 
reluctance is a response to “pluralism anxiety”—the notion that if the Court 
takes the notion of suspect classifications seriously, it will be forced to 
recognize “too many groups.”43 
In addition, the Court has determined that a law having a discriminatory 
impact, but devoid of any facial classification, will be subject only to 
rational basis review, regardless of the group affected by the discrimination.  
The only way to achieve a higher level of scrutiny is to make the 
exceptionally difficult showing of discriminatory intent.  Further, while the 
Court initially permitted plaintiffs to prove discriminatory purpose in a 
 
 38. See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 1080 (describing manner in 
which structure of contemporary equal protection jurisprudence undermines rather than 
advances antisubordination goals); see also Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection 
Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional 
Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2342–43 (2006) (describing critiques of the tiers-
of-scrutiny framework). 
 39. See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 1079 (referencing Professor Gerald 
Gunther’s observation that strict scrutiny was “strict in theory and fatal in fact”). 
 40. See id. (“These levels of scrutiny allow the Court to justify rulings in favor of the 
government with little analysis of the competing constitutional interests.”). 
 41. See id. (“This framework creates a strong presumption in favor of rationality review:  
only in exceptional circumstances—if there is a fundamental right or suspect classification—
does the Court apply heightened scrutiny.”). 
 42. See Yoshino, supra note 30, at 757 (noting that the Supreme Court has not accorded 
heightened scrutiny to any new group based on suspect classification since 1977 and arguing 
that “[a]t least with respect to federal equal protection jurisprudence, this canon has closed”). 
 43. See id. at 748. 
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number of ways,44 the Court subsequently limited the category by 
ratcheting up the requirement for a showing of discriminatory purpose—
requiring a showing that the decision maker chose a particular course of 
action at least in part because of its anticipated discriminatory impact.45  
Due to the difficulty of making this showing, an additional swath of equal 
protection cases has been channeled into rational basis review.46 
Because the categories of suspect class, quasi-suspect class, and 
fundamental right are seemingly closed and heightened scrutiny is virtually 
inaccessible absent a facial classification, the vast majority of equal 
protection claims will be subject only to rational basis review.  Combine 
this with the fact that rational basis review is an exceptionally deferential—
some would say toothless—standard, and judicial review under the Equal 
Protection Clause is left gutted.  This is where the doctrine of 
unconstitutional animus comes in.  A showing of animus represents one of 
the few viable arrows in a plaintiff’s quiver under these circumstances, 
which makes it an important subject of inquiry. 
B.  Animus and Rational Basis Review 
As a matter of historical fact, proving that a law is based on 
unconstitutional animus is virtually the only way for a plaintiff to defeat 
deferential rational basis review.  When the Court subjects a claim to 
rational basis review, it is overwhelmingly probable that the plaintiff will 
lose.47  Indeed, the number of rational basis cases in which plaintiffs have 
prevailed is so small that these cases have become an object of study in and 
of themselves.  Gerald Gunther famously took up this topic in his 1972 
Harvard Law Review article reviewing the cases decided in the Court’s 
1971 term.48  Gunther initially identified seven equal protection cases 
decided under rational basis review in which the plaintiff prevailed.  He 
attributed the plaintiffs’ victories in these cases to the evolution of a new, 
yet-unacknowledged level of scrutiny:  rational basis with “bite.”49  
Specifically, Gunther observed that the court appeared to have increased the 
rigor with which it applied the tailoring prong of rational basis review.  All 
levels of scrutiny have a government-interest prong (does the law purport to 
serve a legitimate/important/compelling government interest) and a 
tailoring prong (is the classification employed by the law sufficiently 
related to advancing the purported government interest).  Gunther predicted 
 
 44. See id. at 764. 
 45. Pers. Admin’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 46. See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 1081 (discussing one such case). 
 47. See id. at 1076 (stating that under rational basis review, “the odds are overwhelming 
that the government will prevail”); Yoshino, supra note 30, at 759–60 (describing lenity of 
rational basis review). 
 48. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword:  In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1972). 
 49. See id. at 21–22. 
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that equal protection jurisprudence would develop to involve less scrutiny 
of substantive legislative ends (sufficiency of the government’s interest) 
and more scrutiny of legislative means (sufficiency of tailoring).50 
But as subsequent commentators noted, the “rational basis with bite” 
standard did not have much in the way of legs.51  A number of the cases 
Gunther identified as rational basis cases ended up actually being proto-
heightened scrutiny cases.52  Others appeared to be aberrations.53  As 
discussed below, the remainder can be explained by an alternative theory:  
that the Court found that the laws in those cases were based on 
unconstitutional animus.54 
Robert Farrell’s 1999 survey of rational basis rulings in favor of plaintiffs 
found that Gunther’s theory that the Court had developed a new “rational 
basis with bite” standard had not stood the test of time.  Between 1971 and 
1999, “the Court decided 110 cases in which it used minimal scrutiny,” of 
which “plaintiffs prevailed in only ten.”55  Upon review, Farrell concluded 
that these cases could not be explained by a “rational basis with bite” 
standard, or by a number of other theories.  But at least half of these—U.S. 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,56 Plyler v. Doe,57 Zobel v. 
 
 50. Id. at 20–30. 
 51. See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court 
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 373–82 (1999). 
 52. Id. at 362–65. 
 53. See id. at 369–70.  One of the seven cases dropped out because it was not an equal 
protection case. Id. at 361.  Three additional cases were later conceptually subsumed within 
heightened scrutiny because they dealt with gender and illegitimacy. Id. at 370–72.  James v. 
Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972)—a case that touched on the right to counsel—invoked 
language strikingly similar to the Court’s 1996 animus-based decision in Romer.  In 
particular, the Strange Court noted that the challenged law “strips from indigent defendants 
the array of protective exemptions Kansas has erected for other civil judgment debtors” and 
emphasized the principle “that the Equal Protection Clause ‘imposes a requirement of some 
rationality in the nature of the class singled out.’” See Strange, 407 U.S. at 135, 140 (1972) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308–09 (1966)).  Gunther hailed 
Strange as another example of the Court focusing on means (sufficiency of tailoring) as 
opposed to ends (sufficiency of the governmental interest). See Gunther, supra note 48, at 
33.  But the Strange Court was concerned about the manner in which the statute set apart and 
disadvantaged the targeted class:  “The statute before us embodies elements of punitiveness 
and discrimination which violate the rights of citizens to equal treatment under the law.” 
Strange, 407 U.S. at 142.  Thus, the linchpin to that decision could be interpreted as the 
presence of impermissible animus rather than application of a heightened form of rational 
basis review. 
  The final pair of Gunther’s cases, involving civil commitment procedures, did 
indeed seem to bear the indicia of a new, more vigorous form of rational basis review:  
intolerance of over- and underinclusiveness; refusal to hypothesize legitimate purposes; 
placing the burden on the state to present evidence of an “affirmative relation between means 
and ends.” See Gunther, supra note 48, at 47.  But, as is apparent now, this standard did not 
become the default test for future rational basis cases. 
 54. See Gunther, supra note 48, at 27–30. 
 55. See Farrell, supra note 51, at 370. 
 56. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 57. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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Williams,58 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,59 and Romer—are, 
as argued below, properly categorized as animus cases.  This suggests, 
contrary to Gunther’s assertion, that the real concern in many of these cases 
was with ends and not means—that insufficient tailoring was merely 
symptomatic of an improper purpose:  animus. 
C.  Animus and Heightened Scrutiny 
Animus is also relevant in cases of heightened scrutiny.  For example, the 
Supreme Court clearly relied on animus—defined as private bias—in 
Palmore v. Sidoti,60 a case involving race classifications that was subject to 
strict scrutiny review.  Similarly, as discussed at length below, both Loving 
v. Virginia61 and Brown v. Board of Education62 may properly be 
understood as cases where the Court invalidated state action because it 
expressed and enforced private bias. 
Because laws based on animus cannot survive rational basis review, by 
definition neither can they survive intermediate or strict scrutiny.  As a 
concept that cuts across the tiers-of-scrutiny framework, the prohibition 
against basing laws in animus represents the broader and more universal 
commitments of the Equal Protection Clause—namely, a fundamental anti-
caste orientation that applies with equal concern to all discrimination 
against social groups, regardless of whether they have been recognized as 
suspect classifications. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S ANIMUS JURISPRUDENCE 
Animus is crucial to equal protection jurisprudence—but what exactly is 
animus, what counts as evidence of animus, and how does it function 
doctrinally?  Recognized animus cases are few in number.  Only four 
decisions of the Supreme Court explicitly rely on language that can be 
traced with certainty to the concept of unconstitutional animus.63  
Nonetheless, these cases set the foundation for a coherent doctrine.  In 
addition, the themes developed in these cases are further elaborated upon in 
 
 58. 457 U.S. 55 (1982). 
 59. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 60. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 61. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 63. This Article addresses animus in the context of the Supreme Court’s decisions under 
the federal Equal Protection Clause, and does not look at animus as discussed in distinct 
doctrinal contexts, such as actions brought under Section 1985 of the Civil Rights Act. See, 
e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971) (“‘The object of the amendment is . . . 
to confine the authority of this law to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the 
equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect 
of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as 
contrasted with his and other citizens’ rights, shall be within the scope of the remedies of this 
section.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 1ST 
SESS. 478 (1871))). 
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another set of cases that, while not explicitly referring to animus, share a 
conceptual heritage. 
A.  Recognized Animus Cases 
The Court has explicitly relied on the concept of unconstitutional animus 
in only four cases.64  Each of these cases presents a different facet of the 
doctrine. 
1.  Animus As Desire to Harm:  U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno 
The first of the Court’s recognized animus cases is the 1972 decision in 
Moreno.  At issue in that case was a 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp 
Act of 1964, which withdrew food stamp benefits if any individual living in 
a household was unrelated to the other residents.65  This was considered an 
equal protection problem because, by imposing this restriction, the law 
“create[d] two classes of persons for food stamp purposes:  one . . . 
composed of those individuals who live in households all of whose 
members are related to one another, and the other [consisting] of those 
individuals who live in households containing one or more members who 
are unrelated to the rest.”66  Prior to the 1971 amendment, the Act drew no 
such distinction.67  Rather, the original language specifically defined a 
household as “‘a group of related or non-related individuals.’”68 
While the amendment was intended to exclude a particular reviled social 
group—“hippies”—the plaintiffs who challenged the law were not 
themselves hippies, but instead represented the collateral damage resulting 
from the poorly drawn classification.  For instance, one plaintiff was a fifty-
six-year old diabetic man living with an unrelated woman and her three 
children in order to reduce expenses and receive medical care.69  Another 
plaintiff, who lived with her three children, took in an unrelated young 
woman to help the young woman with her emotional difficulties.70  Yet 
another pair of unrelated women lived together in order to afford a home in 
a neighborhood where one’s deaf daughter would be able to attend a school 
providing special instruction for the deaf.71 
 
 64. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
473 U.S. 432 (1985); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 65. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. at 530 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 
78 Stat. 703, 703–09 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036a (2006 & Supp. V 
2011))). 
 69. Id. at 531. 
 70. Id. at 532. 
 71. Id. 
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Because the law involved neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, 
the Court applied rational basis review.72  As discussed above, rational 
basis review, like the other tiers of scrutiny, embodies a two-part test:  first, 
the law must serve some legitimate state interest; second, the classification 
must be rationally related to that interest.73  Thus, the challenged law must 
survive both a sufficiency-of-the-state-interest prong (is the state interest 
legitimate?) and a sufficiency-of-tailoring prong (is the classification 
rationally related to that interest?). 
The Moreno Court determined that the goal of excluding hippies from 
food stamp benefits failed both prongs.  Regarding the sufficiency of the 
state interest, the Court first assessed the narrow congressional aim in 
passing the amendment, which the Court determined to be explicitly based 
on impermissible animus.74  Indeed, Congress did not disguise its motives.  
The legislative record revealed that Congress altered the definition of 
“household” to “prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from 
participating in the food stamp program.”75  The Court concluded that 
excluding hippies from food stamp benefits was not a legitimate 
governmental interest:  “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal 
protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a 
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”76  A “purpose to discriminate 
against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to [some 
independent] considerations in the public interest, justify the 1971 
amendment.”77 
The Moreno Court also concluded that the amendment failed the tailoring 
prong of rational basis review.  The Court first considered what other 
legitimate state interests the amendment might serve, focusing on the 
government’s general interest in the Food Stamp Act:  “to safeguard the 
health and well-being of the Nation’s population and raise levels of 
nutrition among low-income households.”78  Increasing food security 
among the poor was clearly a legitimate state interest, but the Court 
 
 72. Id. at 533. 
 73. See supra Part I.B. 
 74. See id. at 534–35. 
 75. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 91-1793, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep.); 
116 CONG. REC. 44439 (1970) (statement of Sen. Holland)).  
 76. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 77. Id. at 534–35. 
 78. Id. at 533.  The Act was also geared toward strengthening the agricultural economy 
by better distributing agricultural products. See id. at 533–34 (“The Congress further finds 
that increased utilization of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of 
nutrition will promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances 
and will strengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing 
and distribution of food.  To alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is 
herein authorized which will permit low-income households to purchase a nutritionally 
adequate diet through normal channels of trade.” (quoting Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. 
No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703, 703–09 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036a (2006 & 
Supp. V 2011))). 
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concluded that “[t]he challenged statutory classification (households of 
related persons versus households containing one or more unrelated 
persons) is clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act.”79  
Specifically, the relatedness or lack of relatedness between different 
members of a household did not affect their nutritional needs.80  Thus, there 
was no affirmative connection between the trait that defined the classified 
group and the group’s interest in the governmental benefit being distributed, 
or, indeed, the government’s interest in offering the benefits in the first 
place. 
The government had also offered fraud prevention as a legitimate 
governmental interest independent of the bare desire to discriminate against 
hippies.81  But while the Court determined that this interest was also 
legitimate, it ultimately concluded that the relatedness classification was so 
poorly tailored to accomplishing the antifraud goal that the goal itself could 
not be credited.82  Again, there was no affirmative reason to think that this 
group was more prone to commit fraud than any other. 
Thus, Moreno set the pattern for the one-two punch of animus analysis.  
First, the Court discerned affirmative evidence of a “desire to harm” a 
specific social group.83  This goal—discrimination for the sake of 
discrimination—was an impermissible function of the law.84  Second, the 
Court examined the other purported state interests, requiring that the trait 
that defined the classification be affirmatively related to the 
accomplishment of those interests.85  The second step is a heightened, 
means-oriented analysis of the type that Gunther described in setting forth 
the standard for rational basis with bite.86  But it appears that this more 
 
 79. Id. at 534. 
 80. Id. (“As the District Court recognized, ‘[t]he relationships among persons 
constituting one economic unit and sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with their 
abilities to stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing farm surpluses, or with their 
personal nutritional requirements.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 313 (D.D.C. 1972))). 
 81. See id. at 535. 
 82. Id. at 536–37 (noting that “the challenged classification simply does not operate so 
as rationally to further the prevention of fraud,” and that “[t]he existence of [more precise 
antifraud] provisions necessarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition that the 1971 
amendment could rationally have been intended to prevent those very same abuses”). 
 83. Id. at 534. 
 84. See id. at 534–35; supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 85. See id. at 534 (“As the District Court recognized, ‘[t]he relationships among persons 
constituting one economic unit and sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with their 
abilities to stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing farm surpluses, or with their 
personal nutritional requirements.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 313 (D.D.C. 1972))). 
 86. Under the traditional rational basis standard, if it was possible that at least some 
unrelated households were committing fraud, the fact that the classification was both under- 
and overinclusive (i.e., it failed to capture others who might be committing fraud and 
captured many who were not committing fraud—like the sympathetic plaintiffs in the case) 
would not defeat the law. See Gunther, supra note 48, at 21–22.  Indeed, the notions of 
under- and overinclusiveness have no place in a rational basis review analysis, but should be 
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vigorous examination was prompted by the presence of affirmative 
evidence of animus in the legislative history.  In this case, the presence of 
animus poisons the well, discrediting other explanations as mere pretext for 
unconstitutional discrimination. 
On a broader level, the tailoring of the amendment was also problematic 
because it used status as a proxy for conduct.  The Moreno Court 
considered the classification irrational because it was based on “wholly 
unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the differences between ‘related’ 
and ‘unrelated’ households.”87  That is, the law used the status of 
relatedness as a proxy for the conduct of fraud.  The Court noted that there 
were other portions of the Food Stamp Act that were directly targeted at 
preventing fraud—unlike the challenged provision, which sought to do so 
indirectly by using relatedness as an extremely imprecise proxy for 
propensity to commit fraud.88  The Court also noted that “[t]he existence of 
these [other antifraud] provisions necessarily casts considerable doubt upon 
the proposition that the 1971 amendment could rationally have been 
intended to prevent those very same abuses.”89 
Further doubt was cast on the legitimacy of the purported antifraud goal 
because the amendment was not congruent with the larger goals of the Act.  
Not only did the amendment do nothing to further the purported 
governmental interest in preventing fraud, it actually thwarted the primary 
purpose of the Act:  providing food security to those in need.90  Those who 
fraudulently claimed financial need could easily evade the exclusion by not 
cohabiting.  Thus, the victims of the exclusion would be the truly destitute, 
who had no choice but to share living expenses with others.91 
Thus, where the challenged law relied on a status-based classification, 
and where there was direct evidence of private bias toward a specific social 
group, the Court required an affirmative connection between the trait 
defining the classification (relatedness) and either the individual’s need for 
the subject benefits (food security) or the government’s interest in 
regulating those benefits (providing food security; preventing fraud).  This 
is not necessarily equivalent to shifting the burden onto the government, but 
it does require the Court be able to identify and articulate this connection.   
From another perspective, it gives plaintiffs the opportunity to prove a 
positive—the presence of unconstitutional animus—as opposed to a 
negative—the lack of any conceivable rational basis for a law.  If there is no 
 
reserved for the close tailoring requirements of heightened scrutiny. See Sunstein, supra note 
8, at 55 (“But [under- and overinclusiveness] do[] not doom a statute under rational basis 
review; [they are] perfectly acceptable, indeed quite common.”).  Thus, it is perfectly 
permissible for legislatures to rely on under- or overinclusive classifications; this is a far cry 
from the classification being irrational. 
 87. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535. 
 88. See id. at 536. 
 89. Id. at 536–37. 
 90. See id. at 539. 
 91. See id. 
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articulable reason why this group is being selected for differential 
treatment, then the designation is arbitrary—the law creates a classification 
for the sake of a classification—and this supports an inference that the law 
is actually based on animus rather than a permissible governmental purpose. 
The Court’s structural analysis (i.e., its analysis of the means-ends 
connection) in Moreno is doctrinally significant.  The Court had already 
noted the direct evidence of legislative ill will toward hippies.  The Court’s 
concern in analyzing the antifraud justification was different.  The Court 
was concerned with the law’s reliance on “unsubstantiated assumptions” 
about groups of persons based on their status (lack of family relationship) 
rather than their conduct (actually committing fraud or fraud-related acts).92  
Significantly, this latter analysis was not directly concerned with spite or 
malice toward an unpopular group; it was a concern with a particular type 
of imprecision in lawmaking:  using a group’s status as a proxy for 
anticipated conduct.  This, in turn, points to more fundamental and 
universal suspicion of all class-based legislation—not just that affecting 
suspect or quasi-suspect classes. 
Justice Rehnquist dissented, commenting that the majority was acting as 
super-legislature in invalidating the amendment, rather than remaining in its 
proper judicial role as defender of constitutional rights.  Justice Rehnquist 
offered that “[t]he Court’s opinion would make a very persuasive 
congressional committee report arguing against the adoption of the 
limitation in question.”93  This critique is on-point.  Rational basis review is 
an easy standard for the government to meet precisely because it is meant to 
force judicial deference to the legislative branch, even in cases of 
questionable lawmaking. 
And if the majority in Moreno had confined itself to concluding that the 
law was poorly tailored, Justice Rehnquist’s critique would have thoroughly 
undermined the basis of the opinion.  If animus is nothing more than a lack 
of fit between means and ends, then it becomes a doctrinal vehicle for 
second-guessing the legislature. 
But the majority in Moreno was saying something more.  It was not 
saying that it disagreed with the substantive policy goal of excluding 
hippies from food stamp assistance.  Indeed, the majority did not engage the 
merits of this policy at all.  Rather, the majority pointed to the unintended 
and unfair consequences of using a status-based classification to punish 
disfavored groups.94  In this case, reliance on the classification had the 
effect of punishing many people who were not the target of Congress’s anti-
 
 92. Id. at 535. 
 93. Id. at 545 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 94. See id. at 538 (majority opinion) (“Thus, in practical operation, the 1971 amendment 
excludes from participation in the food stamp program, not those persons who are likely to 
abuse the program, but, rather, only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that 
they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.” 
(emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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hippie policy, as the choice of plaintiffs demonstrated.  In addition, rather 
than questioning the anti-hippie policy or second guessing the legislative 
tailoring, the majority in Moreno emphasized that the Equal Protection 
Clause abhors classifications undertaken for their own sake (i.e., 
classifications undertaken for the sake of excluding some from benefits but 
not others without some affirmative justification for doing so).95 
Justice Rehnquist correctly insisted that the fact that a law has 
unfortunate consequence—in Moreno, denying benefits to individuals who 
were genuinely in need—is not a basis for invalidating a law.  Such 
decisions are within the legislature’s purview.  But while the plaintiffs’ 
dilemma served as the sympathetic hook for the majority decision, it was 
not, in fact, the reason the law was held invalid.  The law was properly 
invalidated because it represented arbitrary, class-based legislation of the 
type that is offensive to equal protection principles.  The effect on the 
sympathetic plaintiffs was simply evidence of the negative, unintended 
consequences of punitive, class-based legislation. 
 2.  Animus as Private Bias:  Palmore v. Sidoti 
The Court’s next animus case, Palmore, departs somewhat from the 
model established in the Court’s other animus decisions.  To begin with, it 
is a case involving race discrimination, so strict scrutiny was available.  But 
Palmore is nonetheless one of the recognized progenitors of the animus 
doctrine relied on in subsequent animus decisions like Cleburne and Romer.  
Further, it adds an important aspect to our understanding of unconstitutional 
animus.  Specifically, while the private bias in the Moreno case was 
expressed by state actors, Palmore was concerned with bias originating in 
private actors. 
The form of state action at issue in Palmore was a family court order 
taking custody of a child away from the mother and granting it instead to 
the father.96  The basis for the family court’s decision was the mother’s 
marriage to a man of a different race.97  The family court’s concern was that 
the mother’s marriage choice would subject the child to stigmatization.98  
Thus, the court’s order relied on a racial classification because “the 
outcome [of the matter] would have been different had petitioner married a 
Caucasian male of similar respectability.”99  In other words, race served to 
determine the allocation of legal rights. 
 
 95. See id. at 534 (noting that “to be sustained, the challenged classification must 
rationally further some legitimate governmental interest other than those specifically stated 
in the congressional declaration of policy”—i.e., to prevent so-called “hippies” and “hippie 
communes” from participating in the food stamp program (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 96. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430–31 (1984). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. at 431. 
 99. Id. at 432. 
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Because the family court order relied on a race classification, the 
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny review in assessing the 
constitutionality of the family court’s ruling.100  The Court assessed the 
state interests at stake, and had little difficulty concluding that the broader 
goal of “granting custody based on the best interests of the child is 
indisputably a substantial governmental interest for purposes of the Equal 
Protection Clause.”101  Further, the Court acknowledged the reality of racial 
and ethnic prejudices that would affect the experience of the child, and 
likely in a negative way.102  And it is beyond dispute that if racial prejudice 
is the problem, then reliance on a race classification is not only narrowly 
tailored, but perfectly tailored, to address that problem.  Hostility toward 
mixed-race couples was pervasive, and it was only by keeping the child out 
of such a relationship that the child could be shielded from those negative 
social effects.  In other words, the family court’s decision arguably satisfied 
the strict scrutiny standard—the government had a compelling interest in 
preserving the best interests of the child, and taking custody away from the 
mother directly addressed that concern.  But the superficial validity of the 
family court’s order was poisoned by its capitulation to private bias. 
On this point the Court famously stated, “Private biases may be outside 
the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them 
effect.”103  Note that the Court did not question whether the underlying bias 
against mixed-race couples was fair or unfair (in Justice Scalia’s vernacular, 
whether bias against mixed-race couples was just a form of legitimate 
“Kulturkampf”104 for the time), but instead focused exclusively on the fact 
that the family court’s order served to give effect to that bias.105  This focus 
underscores that the problem with laws based on animus is that they 
function to express and enforce private bias against a particular social 
group, regardless of whether that bias itself is widely held or based in moral 
or religious considerations.  In short, the criticism lodged by Palmore does 
not necessitate an inquiry into the nature or validity of the underlying bias 
itself.  Rather, Palmore focuses us on the fact that (1) as a general 
proposition, the public laws are not to express and enforce private bias, and 
(2) when they do, this invalidates the law, regardless of whether there is a 
 
 100. Id. at 432–33.  The Court in Palmore articulated the strict scrutiny standard as 
requiring that the classification “be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must 
be ‘necessary . . . to the accomplishment’ of their legitimate purpose.” Id. 
 101. Id. at 433. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. at 433. 
 104. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court 
has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.”). 
 105. Similarly, as discussed above, the Court in Moreno conducted no inquiry into 
whether bias against “hippies”—a classification that, unlike race, did not enjoy any form of 
protected status—was justified. See supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text.  The doctrine 
of unconstitutional animus does not distinguish between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” 
biases; it prohibits legislation that functions to enforce any type of social-group bias.  In this 
sense, the doctrine is formal, ahistorical, and universal. 
 908 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
plausible government interest being served (for example, protecting the 
bests interests of the child). 
3.  Animus As Stereotype and Fear:  City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center 
The Court’s next animus decision also addressed a situation where state 
actors were deferring to the biases of private actors.  In Cleburne, the Court 
reviewed two distinct but related forms of state action.  The first form of 
state action was enactment of a city zoning regulation that required a special 
use permit for the operation of certain types of group homes, including 
“[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded.”106  The plaintiff, Cleburne 
Living Center (CLC), had proposed to build a group home for persons with 
cognitive disabilities.107  CLC was required to obtain a special use permit 
under the zoning regulation, as the home was considered analogous to a 
hospital for the “feeble-minded.”  The second form of state action was the 
City Council’s decision under the ordinance to deny the special use permit 
following a hearing on the request.108  Accordingly, CLC challenged the 
zoning ordinance as facially invalid, and also challenged the regulation as 
applied, based on the denial of the request submitted pursuant to the 
regulation.109  The Court took up the latter challenge. 
In its initial analysis determining what level of scrutiny to apply to the 
equal protection claim, the Court rejected the argument that persons with 
cognitive disabilities should be deemed a quasi-suspect class.110  The Court 
examined all of the suspect classification criteria, including immutability 
and political powerlessness, but focused on the fact that members of this 
group were, in fact, generally compromised in their ability to function in 
society, such that it would often be valid for legislative bodies to rely on a 
related classification.111 
Although the Court determined that the CLC’s claims did not merit 
heightened scrutiny,112 the Court emphasized that this did not leave 
plaintiffs without judicial protection.  Specifically, citing Moreno, the Court 
reiterated that even under deferential rational basis review, governments 
may not rely on classifications that are “arbitrary” or “irrational,” nor may 
laws be based on “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
 
 106. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 436 (1985) (alteration in 
original) (quoting CLEBURNE, TEX., COMPREHENSIVE ZONING ORDINANCE, § 8 (1965)). 
 107. See id. at 435–36. 
 108. See id. at 437. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. at 442. 
 111. See id. at 442–44.  Even though the Court determined that the trait of developmental 
disability was generally relevant to valid legislative purposes, the Court ultimately circled 
back around to ask whether the trait was relevant to the specific legislative interest behind 
the law in question—and concluded that it was not. See id. at 447–50. 
 112. See id. at 442–43. 
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group.”113  And, indeed, the Court concluded that it was precisely these 
impermissible purposes that were in play in the City Council’s decision. 
In support of this conclusion, the Court cited direct evidence of ill will on 
the part of community members as recorded in the legislative history.  
Specifically, in debating whether to grant the special use permit, 
community members came forward to express negative attitudes toward and 
fears of persons with cognitive disabilities.114  They also expressed concern 
that students from a nearby school might harass the CLC residents.115  
Thus, the animus at issue was not “a bare . . . desire to harm” on the part of 
the City Council, but was rather the City Council’s response to community 
members’ fears and stereotypes.  The Court rejected these views as a valid 
basis for legislative decision making, citing Palmore for the proposition that 
the law cannot give effect to private biases.116  Even under deferential 
rational basis review, this was not a legitimate state interest. 
As in Moreno, the Court in Cleburne went on to examine the other 
purported goals of the City Council’s decision.  The Court considered the 
structure of the challenged state action as evidence supporting an inference 
of animus.117  Specifically, the Court examined the connection between the 
trait defining the group (cognitive disability) and the goals purportedly 
served by the City Council’s decision.118  Ultimately, the Court declined to 
apply heightened scrutiny because it concluded that persons with cognitive 
disabilities were, in fact, different from others in ways that were 
presumptively relevant to public legislation.119 
But “this difference”—cognitive disability—was “largely irrelevant” to 
the particular interests advanced by the city.120  Those interests included 
avoiding excessive density, crowding, fire and flood safety, and traffic 
congestion.121  As the Court reasoned, “The question is whether it is 
rational to treat the mentally retarded differently.  It is true that they suffer 
disability not shared by others; but why this difference warrants a density 
regulation that others need not observe is not at all apparent.”122  The Court 
emphasized that these concerns would be present with any request for group 
housing, including apartment buildings and fraternities and sororities—
types of multiple dwellings not addressed by the zoning regulation.123  
Because “[t]he City never justifie[d] its apparent view that other people can 
live under such ‘crowded’ conditions when mentally retarded persons 
 
 113. Id. at 446–47 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 114. See id. at 448. 
 115. See id. at 449. 
 116. Id. at 448 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)). 
 117. See id. at 448–50. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. at 442–46. 
 120. Id. at 448. 
 121. See id. at 450. 
 122. Id. at 449–50. 
 123. See id. 
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cannot,”124 the Court inferred that “requiring the permit in this case appears 
to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”125 
Again, the classification at issue here was arguably rationally related to 
the governmental interest on a superficial level.  Indeed, almost any form of 
group housing could pose concerns in terms of density, crowding, fire and 
flood safety, etc.  But what the Court concerned itself with was the fact that 
people with developmental disabilities had been arbitrarily targeted for 
regulation whereas other groups had not.  The targeting was arbitrary 
because the trait that characterized this group had no special relevance to 
the government’s purported interests as compared to other, objectively 
similar groups that were not regulated.  This objective, structural feature of 
the state action at issue supported an inference of animus.  Thus, while 
underinclusiveness generally would not be fatal under traditional rational 
basis review, when that underinclusiveness approaches arbitrariness, this 
suggests that the law “rest[s] on an irrational prejudice” against the 
classified group.126  Direct evidence indicating that the purpose of the law 
was to discriminate against a particular social group discredited the other 
purposes offered by the government and required a credible explanation of 
how the trait at issue related to the object of the regulation. 
4.  Animus and Sexual Orientation:  Romer v. Evans 
The concept of unconstitutional animus reappeared in dramatic fashion 
over a decade later in Romer.  The law at issue in Romer was an amendment 
to the Colorado Constitution that had been enacted by popular 
referendum.127  The purpose and function of Amendment 2 was to eliminate 
and prevent future adoption of any antidiscrimination protections based on 
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual status.128 
The Court declined to address whether sexual orientation was a suspect 
classification, or whether Amendment 2 infringed on a fundamental right, 
such that some form of heightened scrutiny would be required.  Instead, the 
Court proceeded directly to rational basis review, appearing to acknowledge 
its deferential nature:  “a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a 
legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to 
the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems 
tenuous.”129 
As discussed above, the Court had previously identified animus on two 
bases:  (1) direct evidence that the law was based on private bias toward a 
 
 124. Id. at 450 (quoting Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 202 (5th 
Cir. 1984)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).  The amendment was referred to as 
“Amendment 2.” Id. at 623. 
 128. See id. at 624. 
 129. Id. at 632. 
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particular social group (on the part of either state or private actors) and 
(2) an inference of animus based on a law’s structure—specifically, the lack 
of an affirmative connection between the trait defining a group and the 
purported goal of the law or other state action.130  Although there was a vast 
record of antigay sentiments (i.e., direct evidence of private bias) giving 
birth to the referendum that enacted Amendment 2,131 the Romer Court did 
not rely on or even discuss such evidence in finding that the law was based 
on animus.  Rather, the Court focused exclusively on the law’s structure. 
Why would the Court ignore such strong direct evidence of 
impermissible animus?  This omission is probably best explained by the 
fact that the Romer decision was handed down in the awkward interstitial 
period between the Court’s decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick132 and 
Lawrence v. Texas.  Bowers permitted states to criminalize homosexual 
sodomy, in essence making it legitimate to disfavor homosexual and 
bisexual orientation, as homosexual conduct closely correlates to 
homosexual status.133  Lawrence later overturned Bowers, declaring that 
states could not criminalize private, consensual sexual conduct between 
adults based on bare moral disapproval of that conduct.134  However, 
Romer, which involved a law disfavoring homosexual and bisexual 
orientation in a different context, was decided prior to Lawrence.  With 
Bowers still on the books, the Romer Court could hardly deem homosexuals 
and bisexuals to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class, or question the general 
validity of antigay legislation. 
So although the Romer Court could have easily relied on direct evidence 
of animus, it ignored this evidence and instead performed a novel structural 
analysis.  Specifically, the Romer Court relied on two different 
characteristics of Amendment 2 to infer the presence of unconstitutional 
animus.  The first related to what can be characterized as a radical lack of fit 
between the law’s means and ends.  Again, under traditional rational basis 
review, even a radical lack of fit may be acceptable.  And under the 
traditional standard, the law likely would have been upheld—the Court 
would simply require that there be some possible connection between the 
classification relied upon by the challenged law (here, sexual orientation) 
and the state interests served by the law (conserving antidiscrimination 
enforcement resources and protecting citizens’ freedom of association). 
And such a connection was clearly present in Romer.  Sexual orientation 
was previously a basis for antidiscrimination protection, and so sexual 
 
 130. For (1), see supra Part II.A.1–2.  For (2), see supra Part II.A.3. 
 131. See Cara DeGette, Inside the Belly of the Beast, in RESISTING THE RAINBOW: RIGHT-
WING RESPONSES TO LGBT GAINS, POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 29 (2012), 
http://www.publiceye.org/Reports/CO%20Case%20Study.pdf. 
 132. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 133. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581–82 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is 
conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual.”). 
 134. See id. at 578. 
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orientation was self-evidently relevant to reconfiguring the priorities of 
antidiscrimination law.  Similarly, if a state seeks to protect citizens’ right 
not to associate with homosexuals or bisexuals, sexual orientation is 
precisely the relevant classification to protect that right. 
The Court avoided this difficulty by changing the terms of the means and 
ends analysis.  The Court focused not on the precise mechanism 
Amendment 2 employed (i.e., the classification of sexual orientation), but 
on Amendment 2’s impact, which it characterized as vast.135  Indeed, the 
Court devoted an entire separate section of its opinion to describing the 
law’s impact, explaining that rather than placing homosexuals and bisexuals 
on a level playing field with everyone else, the law actively stripped 
homosexuals of rights, first by repealing local antidiscrimination 
ordinances.136  In addition, Amendment 2 prevented municipalities from 
enacting any new protective legislation in the future without first amending 
the state constitution to repeal Amendment 2.137  Thus, homosexuals were 
left open to discrimination in the public and private spheres without any 
recourse.  Rather than merely taking away “special rights,” Amendment 2 
“impose[d] a special disability upon those persons [homosexuals and 
bisexuals] alone.”138 
Having described the vast impact of the law, the Court then asked 
whether that impact was justified by the State’s purported interests in the 
law and concluded that it was not.  Amendment 2 inflicted on homosexuals 
“immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any 
legitimate justifications that may be claimed for [the law].”139  With respect 
to both of the State’s purported interests, the Court determined that “[t]he 
breadth of the amendment is so far removed from these particular 
justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.”140  Because the 
law’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it . . . 
the amendment seems inexplicable by anything other than animus toward 
the class it affects.”141  Note that rational basis review typically examines 
the relationship between the classification employed and the law’s 
purpose—examining whether the law’s purpose justifies its impact is a 
fundamentally different inquiry and one that involves a largely unfettered 
assessment of fairness. 
In so holding, the Court characterized the first purported state interest—
“conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups”142—as 
relatively trivial.  And the Court reached the same conclusion, without 
extensive analysis, with respect to the second purported state interest:  
 
 135. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632– 34. 
 136. See id. at 627, 629–31. 
 137. Id. at 627 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993)). 
 138. Id. at 631. 
 139. Id. at 635. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 632. 
 142. Id. at 635. 
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protecting citizens’ freedom of association.143  This seems patently 
incorrect.  It may be true that the law would not actually succeed in 
protecting anyone’s freedom of association, or that by “freedom of 
association” the State actually meant “right to unfairly discriminate against 
homosexuals and bisexuals.”  But the Court did not critique this purported 
governmental interest on this level (i.e., it did not focus on whether the 
classification actually served to advance the State’s purported goals or was 
valid in and of itself).  Rather, the Court treated Coloradans’ freedom of 
association as a relatively trivial interest on par with conserving 
antidiscrimination enforcement resources. 
In this way the Court glossed over the real—and most controversial—
issue in the case:  whether it was legitimate for a state to protect citizens’ 
freedom not to associate with members of unpopular groups, and to use the 
law to enforce that right.  As a general matter, after Moreno, Palmore and 
Cleburne, the answer was clearly “no.”  But the Court was hamstrung in 
reaching this conclusion because Bowers was still good law at the time 
Romer was decided.  And Bowers clearly supported the proposition that it 
was permissible to disapprove of homosexual conduct and orientation (as 
Justice Scalia emphasized in his dissent in Romer).  Accordingly, the Romer 
majority performed a sleight of hand.  It could not directly attack the 
validity of antigay bias, so it transformed its analysis into a structural 
critique. 
The second basis on which the Court inferred animus also looked to the 
structure of the law, but from a slightly different angle.  Specifically, the 
Court stated that the discrimination worked by Amendment 2 was “of an 
unusual character,”144 which in and of itself prompted “careful 
consideration”145 of the law’s validity.  Specifically, the law had “the 
peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a 
single named group,”146 “identif[ying] persons by a single trait and then 
den[ying] them protection across the board.”147  Further, the law singled out 
this group—which could fairly be described as “politically unpopular”—for 
a significant rights deprivation.148  The Court focused on the objective 
function of the law, which was to create distinctions between classes of 
persons where none had previously existed.  Prior to Amendment 2, 
homosexuals and bisexuals in Colorado had equal access to 
antidiscrimination measures enacted by local governments.  The objective 
function of Amendment 2 was to differentiate homosexuals and bisexuals 
with respect to these rights. 
 
 143. See id. at 635. 
 144. Id. at 633 (citing Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 227 U.S. 32, 37–38 
(1928)). 
 145. Id. (citing Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 227 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928)). 
 146. Id. at 632. 
 147. Id. at 633. 
 148. Id. at 634 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
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The Court identified “this sort” of law as incompatible with our 
constitutional tradition149: 
[L]aws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or 
general hardships are rare.  A law declaring that in general it shall be 
more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from 
the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the 
most literal sense.150 
In other words, a law may not draw classifications of persons “for the 
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”151  The Court 
alluded to the manner in which this principle enforces the core values of the 
Equal Protection Clause:  “[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”152 
The rule the Court endorsed in Romer is murky.  The Court suggested 
that laws suffering from a radical lack of fit would be presumed to be based 
in animus, but it is unclear how this relates to the existing tailoring 
requirements of rational basis review.  The Court also indicated that animus 
may be inferred where a law is “of an unusual character,” but it is not clear 
exactly what laws would fall into this category.153 
In his dissent, Justice Scalia directly engaged the issue that the majority 
avoided:  whether it was permissible for the law to protect citizens’ rights 
not to associate with those they prefer not to associate.154  As Justice Scalia 
phrased it, the issue was whether Coloradans may seek “to preserve 
traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful 
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.”155  In support of 
this proposition, Justice Scalia reasonably cited to the Court’s own decision 
in Bowers, which had been conspicuously ignored by the majority.156  
Justice Scalia interpreted Bowers as standing for the proposition that it was 
permissible for governments to single out homosexuality for unfavorable 
treatment—in essence, that it was permissible to disfavor homosexual status 
because it was permissible under Bowers to disfavor homosexual 
conduct.157 
Even accepting that Justice Scalia may have been right to rely on the 
connection between homosexual conduct and homosexual status at the time 
that Romer was decided, he lost that ground when the Court decided 
Lawrence, which reversed the Bowers decision.  After Lawrence, even if 
one could equate homosexual conduct with homosexual status, homosexual 
conduct could no longer be criminalized and the related justification for 
 
 149. Id. at 633. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 635 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)). 
 153. Id. at 633. 
 154. See id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 636, 640 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
 157. Id. at 642. 
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disfavoring homosexual status collapsed.  After Lawrence, classifications 
based on homosexual status must be treated the same as all other 
classifications based on status—with presumptive disfavor and an eye 
toward the presence of animus. 
B.  Additional Cases Related to Animus 
The four cases discussed above represent the official canon of cases 
decided on the basis of unconstitutional animus.  But there are additional 
cases in which we can identify a similar theme:  the law at issue was found 
unconstitutional because its primary function was to express and enforce 
distinctions between social classes. 
1.  Animus and Race Segregation:  Brown v. Board of Education and 
Loving v. Virginia 
The first of these cases is Brown.  Brown is both seminal and enigmatic:  
it is seminal in that it is hailed as visionary and just, and enigmatic in that it 
is difficult to pin down exactly what Brown stands for doctrinally.  As is 
well-known, the Court in Brown held that state-sponsored racial segregation 
in public education violated the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of 
whether the segregated schools were purportedly “equal” in terms of 
tangible resources (e.g., physical plant, books, teachers).158  In a succinct 
opinion, the Court advanced two interrelated bases in support of this result.  
First, the Court (in)famously referred to the negative psychological effects 
of segregation on black children.159  The reasoning—which is suspect on 
many levels160—was that segregation deprived black school children of 
equal educational opportunities because it created feelings of inferiority in 
them.  These feelings of inferiority then interfered with their ability to learn 
and to reap the myriad social, economic, and civic benefits of public 
education.161  Under this reasoning, segregation is not necessarily 
inherently problematic, but only because of its negative effects on the 
targeted group. 
 
 158. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 159. See id. at 494 (“To separate [black children] from others of similar age and 
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status 
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”). 
 160. Suspect was (1) the Court’s confidence in contemporary “psychological knowledge” 
and (2) its conclusion that segregation was damaging to black children alone, and not their 
white counterparts. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, The Road Not Taken in Brown: Recognizing the 
Dual Harm of Segregation, 90 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1581–82 (2004) (“This rationale, that 
segregation was unconstitutional solely because of the harm it inflicted in African-
Americans, created the impression that as a remedy for segregation, desegregation amounted 
to a social welfare program where whites were compelled to donate in-kind contributions to 
blacks in the form of interracial contact.  In other words, if the harm occasioned by 
segregation was one-sided and fell only on blacks, as Brown indicated, integration conferred 
benefits only on blacks, which necessarily were paid for by whites.”). 
 161. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
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The second rationale focused more squarely on the morality of 
segregation itself, regardless of documented psychological effects.  The 
Court suggested, albeit sotto voce, that segregation of social groups was 
unconstitutional because it was not a proper function of the public laws.  
Specifically, the Court quoted the Kansas district court opinion to the effect 
that “[t]he impact [of racial segregation] is greater when it has the sanction 
of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as 
denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”162 
Thus, the second rationale for striking the separate-but-equal doctrine 
focused on the expressive function of state action—in Brown, this function 
was to denote the inferiority of one social group to another by requiring 
their separation.  Stated this way, the harm of state-sponsored segregation 
was not that it created “feelings of inferiority,”163 but that it stood as the 
government expressing a judgment that one social group is inferior to 
another—in this case, expressing an ideology of white supremacy.  Whether 
the laws can eliminate privately held ideologies of this nature is one matter, 
but it is clear that the public laws cannot express and enforce such 
ideologies164—even where the goal of doing so is “promotion of [the 
people’s] comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good 
order.”165  Explicit segregation of social groups with respect to important 
public institutions is a prime example of discrimination for the sake of 
discrimination.  It is sufficient evidence of unconstitutional animus, because 
such laws do not purport to serve independent purposes. 
Similarly, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court determined that the challenged 
law impermissibly expressed an ideology of white supremacy through 
legally enforced separation of the races.166  Like the school segregation at 
issue in Brown, the antimiscegenation statute at issue in Loving can be 
characterized as a form of separate-but-equal discrimination.  Indeed, in 
defense of the law, Virginia argued that antimiscegenation laws of this type 
were not of concern to the Equal Protection Clause because they were 
applied to blacks and whites equally:  members of neither group were 
permitted to marry members of the other, and the legal penalties for doing 
so were the same for both.167 
The Court rejected this contention, noting that, as a historical matter, 
reliance on racial classifications was always of concern to the Equal 
Protection Clause.168  Further, like the Brown Court, the Loving Court 
focused on the expressive function of the challenged law and found it 
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substantively impermissible.169  The Court discerned the content of this 
expression in a number of ways.  First, the Court quoted the trial court’s 
opinion sentencing the Lovings to exile from the state.  In that opinion, the 
trial court proclaimed an explicitly racist, quasi-religious, and nominally 
geographical justification for the laws: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and 
he placed them on separate continents.  And but for the interference with 
his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages.  The fact 
that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to 
mix.170 
Second, in addition to the justification provided by the trial court, the 
Court noted the historical context of the adoption of antimiscegenation 
laws, emphasizing their origin in the institution of slavery and in notions of 
racial integrity and nativism.171  Third, the Court rejected precedent 
validating the state purpose of “preserv[ing] the racial integrity of its 
citizens,” as an “obvious[] endorsement of the doctrine of White 
Supremacy.”172  Finally, the Court looked closely at the structure and 
function of the statute, and noted that it was only white persons who were 
not permitted to intermarry with other races; non-whites of different races 
could inter-marry.173  This revealed that the law served no “overriding 
purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination” and was “designed 
to maintain White Supremacy.”174 
Thus, one may read Loving as standing for the proposition that it is 
impermissible for laws to exist solely for the purpose of enforcing 
distinctions between social groups, thereby expressing the view that certain 
social groups are superior to others.  Surely the fact that the segregation at 
issue in Brown and Loving was based on race created particularly weighty 
concerns for the Court.  But the analysis in these cases only works because 
the Court attributed inherent meaning to the act of segregation:  to segregate 
groups that are similarly situated with respect to the right at stake is to 
express an ideology that one social group is inherently inferior to another.  
This the law may not do.  In such cases, the structure and function of the 
law—segregation of social groups—indicates the presence of impermissible 
animus. 
2.  Animus and Class-Based Legislation:  Plyler v. Doe and 
Zobel v. Williams 
The Court’s 1982 decision in Plyler is a case where the plaintiffs 
prevailed under rational basis review, not because the law at issue expressed 
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hostility or ill will per se, but because the law tended to create persistent 
divisions between social classes.175  Plyler is significant for three reasons.  
First, it presents a thorough exegesis on the Equal Protection Clause’s 
concern with status-based classifications (i.e., laws that tend to produce or 
reinforce a caste society).176  Second, like Cleburne, it reaffirms the 
principle announced in Moreno that it is impermissible to exclude members 
of a social group merely for the sake of excluding them.177  Rather, there 
must be some affirmative reason why it is more effective to exclude this 
group than another (i.e., the exclusion must not be arbitrary).178  Third, 
Plyler emphasizes that laws may not be used to punish status through the 
regulation of unrelated conduct.179 
At issue in Plyler was a Texas law that sought to deny public education 
to school-age children who did not have documentation of their citizenship 
status.180  The specific mechanism the State used was withholding funds 
from local school districts to the extent such funds would be used to educate 
children not legally admitted to the United States.181 
The Court began its analysis with the emphatic claim that “[t]he Equal 
Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of 
all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation.”182  The Court then 
proceeded to determine the proper level of scrutiny to apply to the 
challenged legislation, analyzing whether the targeted group—the children 
of undocumented immigrants—should be considered a suspect class.183  
The Court determined that they should not.184  This was because entry into 
the class was “the product of voluntary action”—illegally entering into the 
country.185  Further, it could not be argued that the distinguishing trait of 
the class was presumptively irrelevant to all conceivable legislative 
purposes.186  Immigration status is patently relevant to legitimate goals in 
immigration law and policy. 
But the Court nonetheless expressed an overriding concern with laws that 
punished individuals for circumstances beyond their control187—a core 
principle of equal protection jurisprudence.  It expressed particular concern 
over the fact that undocumented children had little or no control over their 
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undocumented status:  “Legislation imposing special disabilities upon 
groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests 
the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
designed to abolish.”188  Indeed, the undocumented status of these children 
was determined by a combination of the conduct of their parents and the 
poorly implemented immigration policies of the U.S. government.189 
The Court focused on the role of government policies in creating an 
underclass of undocumented immigrants, shifting some of the blame from 
the immigrants themselves, and thus further shifting any conceivable blame 
away from their children.  Indeed, the innocence of the immigrant children 
was a key theme in the Court’s analysis: 
Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its 
beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is 
the product of their own unlawful conduct.  These arguments do not apply 
with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor 
children of such illegal entrants . . . .  [T]he children who are plaintiffs in 
these cases “can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own 
status.” . . .  “[I]mposing disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the 
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some 
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.”190 
This language touches on the core values originally animating the 
Supreme Court’s suspect classification analysis, which can be framed as a 
status/conduct distinction:  in our democracy, the law may only penalize 
conduct that is under the individual’s control, not a status or identity that is 
beyond the individual’s control.191 
The Court also expressed the related principle that laws cannot 
differentially distribute legal benefits based on a trait (undocumented status) 
unrelated to the benefit at issue (primary education).192  In asserting that the 
law met the first prong of rational basis review—serving a legitimate 
governmental interest—the State offered the goal of supporting federal 
immigration policy, which disapproved of the presence of undocumented 
immigrants in the country.193  In assessing this interest, the Court noted that 
it is unquestionably legitimate and within the State’s prerogative to decide 
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how to distribute educational resources and to prefer residents over 
undocumented immigrants.194  But the Court insisted that this was not a 
blanket authorization to impose disabilities on the group—in particular 
because federal immigration policy was not concerned with educational 
opportunities for children.195  Denying educational opportunities to these 
children was “not a rational response” to federal policy disapproving of the 
presence of these children in the country.196  Imposing immigration 
consequences would address the problematic conduct, but imposing 
unrelated educational consequences was effectively punishing status.197 
The State further argued that the law served the interest of “‘preserv[ing] 
the state’s limited resources for the education of its lawful residents.’”198  
The Court responded, “The State must do more than justify its classification 
with a concise expression of an intention to discriminate.”199  Further, there 
was no demonstrated connection between denying education to children and 
the State’s purported interest in “protect[ing] itself from an influx of illegal 
immigrants.”200 
While acknowledging that it was not permitted to “reduce expenditures 
for education by barring [some arbitrarily chosen class of] children from its 
schools,” the State nonetheless contended that excluding undocumented 
children was not “arbitrary.”201  In particular, the State argued that 
educating undocumented children interfered with the goal of “provid[ing] 
high-quality public education.”202  But in examining the record, the Court 
found no evidence of a connection between excluding undocumented 
children and educational quality.203  Rather, the Court concluded that 
undocumented children were “indistinguishable” from other children in 
terms of the costs of educating them.204  Thus, it would be arbitrary to 
single them out for rights deprivation. 
Under Plyler, impermissible animus includes a bare desire to exclude a 
particular social group, and the presence of animus can be proven by the 
lack of an affirmative relationship between the trait defining the 
classification (immigration status) and the interests being regulated (public 
education). 
This concern with laws that enforce class distinction was also at the core 
of the Court’s decision in Zobel.  The law at issue was an Alaska statute 
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that created a fund based on the State’s oil revenue and distributed money 
from that fund differentially to residents based on years of residency.205  In 
a move repeated years later in Romer, the Court declined to consider 
whether heightened scrutiny was required for the law, instead proceeding 
directly to rational basis review.206 
The Court first noted that the State’s goal—“creating a financial 
incentive for individuals to establish and maintain Alaska residence”—was 
not rationally related to the mechanism of financially disfavoring new 
residents.207  Further, the Court expressed concern that “Alaska’s reasoning 
could open the door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits, and 
services according to length of residency.”208  This, in turn, “would permit 
the states to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent 
classes”209—a result that, according to the Court, “would be clearly 
impermissible.”210  The law failed, in part, because of its tendency to create 
permanent social classes—in essence, a caste society. 
3.  Animus and Moral Disapproval:  Lawrence v. Texas 
Finally, we come to Lawrence—the case that righted the wrongs of 
Bowers a mere seventeen years after Bowers was decided.  While nominally 
a due process case, the real focus of Lawrence was to reject differential 
treatment based on sexual orientation.211  Lawrence addressed whether a 
state could criminalize homosexual sodomy that took place in private 
between consenting adults.212  There was no question that the animating 
spirit of the law was bare moral disapproval of homosexual conduct and 
identity.213  The question was whether such disapproval was a permissible 
basis for legislation.214  The Court held that it was not.215 
In 1986, the majority in Bowers had framed the relevant question as 
“whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”216  Starting from this premise, the 
Bowers Court easily concluded that the Constitution conferred no such right 
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and, therefore, state laws could permissibly reflect traditional and deep-
seated moral disapproval of sodomy, homosexuality, and homosexuals.217 
The majority in Lawrence signaled its intent to depart from Bowers’ 
approach with the first words of its decision:  “Liberty protects the person 
from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private 
places.”218  Thus, the Lawrence Court focused on universal rights—
specifically, liberty—and examined the extent to which the government 
could permissibly intrude on individual liberty, rather than searching the 
text of the Constitution for permission to engage in a particular sex act.219  
Thus, the first step in reversing the Bowers decision was to frame the issue 
in terms of broad and common interests in liberty, autonomy, and 
privacy.220  The Lawrence majority then tied these broad concepts to the 
conduct at issue by analogizing to the themes of bodily, reproductive, and 
sexual autonomy present in Eisenstadt v. Baird,221 Griswold v. 
Connecticut,222 and Carey v. Population Services International.223 
And here the submerged equal protection analysis of the Lawrence 
majority began to emerge.  Everyone enjoys rights to bodily autonomy and 
privacy in intimate relations.  Denying these rights to some but not others 
based on sexual orientation was class-based treatment justified by nothing 
more than private moral preferences.  Indeed, despite disavowing an equal 
protection framework, the Court nonetheless asserted that “[p]ersons in a 
homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes [making 
choices about one’s intimate and personal life], just as heterosexual persons 
do.”224 
Laws criminalizing sodomy—whether all acts of sodomy or only 
homosexual sodomy—can be seen as laws that give effect to purely private 
moral preferences, which are not properly the subject of public legislation.  
In this way, Bowers and Lawrence dovetail with the Court’s animus cases 
in reaffirming the proper and improper objective function of the laws.  
Indeed, the Lawrence Court recognized that beliefs about the immorality of 
homosexuality were deeply and sincerely held: 
The condemnation [of homosexual conduct] has been shaped by religious 
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the 
traditional family.  For many persons these are not trivial concerns but 
profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to 
which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives.225 
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Still, the fervor and consensus surrounding these beliefs did not make 
them a fit subject for public legislation:  “These considerations do not 
answer the question before us, however.  The issue is whether the majority 
may use the power of the state to enforce these views on the whole society 
through operation of the criminal law.”226  That is, the reasonableness or 
correctness of the bias does not matter.  “‘[T]he fact that the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral 
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; 
neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation 
from constitutional attack.’”227  It is of course permissible for private actors 
to have such morally and religiously based beliefs, and to fight for their 
beliefs in the realm of culture, but not to use the public laws to enforce and 
reify those beliefs. 
Thus, Lawrence provides contemporary confirmation of truths 
established in earlier cases:  that the law cannot be used to enforce private 
biases, and that the fact that such biases are widely, dearly, and sincerely 
held is irrelevant to the analysis. 
In her concurrence to Lawrence, Justice O’Connor explicitly articulated 
what the majority indicated only implicitly.  The real problem with the anti-
sodomy law was that it targeted homosexuals alone for conduct in which 
heterosexuals were permitted to engage: 
The statute at issue here makes sodomy a crime only if a person “engages 
in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”  
Sodomy between opposite-sex partners, however, is not a crime in Texas.  
That is, Texas treats the same conduct differently based solely on the 
participants.228 
The law was invalid because it “ma[de] homosexuals unequal in the eyes 
of the law by making particular conduct—and only that conduct—subject to 
criminal sanction.”229  In other words, the objective of the law was “‘a bare 
. . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,’”230—an example of 
unconstitutional animus. 
In response to the State’s argument that it had a legitimate interest in 
promoting morality, Justice O’Connor contended (somewhat improbably), 
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that “Bowers did not hold that moral disapproval of a group is a rational 
basis under the Equal Protection Clause.”231  Indeed, Justice O’Connor 
asserted, moral disapproval of a group, “like a bare desire to harm the 
group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under 
the Equal Protection Clause.”232  Justice O’Connor thereby properly placed 
the emphasis back on the status-conduct distinction that is necessarily 
implicated by the Equal Protection Clause’s overarching principles.  Along 
these lines, she rejected that State’s contention that the law targeted conduct 
rather than status, observing that homosexual conduct “is closely correlated 
with being homosexual.”233  Thus, one could not escape the fact that the 
law was “directed toward gay persons as a class.”234 
Both the majority opinion (implicitly) and the concurrence (explicitly) in 
Lawrence recognized the principle that laws criminalizing homosexual 
conduct in fact criminalized homosexual identity, and that bare moral 
disapproval of a social group based upon identity was an impermissible 
purpose for legislation.  This conclusion did not rest on a determination of 
whether the underlying bias was justified, widely held, or based in sincere 
religious or moral beliefs.  Rather, it rested on the premise that the laws do 
not exist to enforce and solidify such biases. 
III.  TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF ANIMUS 
There are three open questions at this point in the Supreme Court’s 
animus jurisprudence:  (1) How does the Court define unconstitutional 
animus?  (2) What does the Court accept as evidence of animus?  (3) What 
doctrinal significance does the Court attach to a finding of animus?  To 
advance the strongest theory of animus, we must answer these questions 
with an eye toward accounting for all of the Supreme Court’s animus cases 
and reflecting the core principles of the Equal Protection Clause. 
A.  Defining Animus 
Definitions of unconstitutional animus can be placed on a spectrum from 
understanding animus as a form of impermissible subjective intent, to 
understanding animus as a form of impermissible objective function.  On 
one end of the spectrum is the understanding of animus that Justice Scalia 
articulated in his dissent to Romer and which the First Circuit recently 
reiterated in Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health and 
Human Services235:  that animus is “a fit of spite.”236  While this narrow 
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understanding accounts for some of the Court’s animus cases, it is refuted 
by the majority of them.237  For example, the record in Cleburne did not 
suggest that the community was expressing “spite” toward those with 
cognitive disabilities.  Rather, the discrimination in that case was based on 
stereotypes and unfounded fears.238  Similarly, in Palmore, the animus at 
issue was not “spite” toward interracial couples per se, but very real and 
very pervasive private bias.239  In the segregation cases—Brown and 
Loving—one cannot directly identify “spite”; rather, there was simply the 
bare purpose of separating groups of persons based on race.240  And finally, 
Plyler and Zobel can be seen as instances where the government merely 
sought to preserve resources for a favored social group, not harm the 
excluded group.241  Thus, there are many forms of subjective intent other 
than “spite” that fall into the category of unconstitutional animus. 
A somewhat broader definition of animus still located in the subjective 
intent camp understands animus as the desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group.  This understanding was first set forth in the Court’s 
decision in Moreno and became the centerpiece of Romer.  Again, however, 
a showing of desire to harm is sufficient to prove animus, but is not 
necessary.  As discussed above, such intent was not explicitly present in 
Palmore, Cleburne, Brown, Loving, Plyler, or Zobel. 
In the wake of Romer, Akhil Amar advanced a theory of animus that 
focused less on subjective intent and more on objective function, 
understanding the animus doctrine as a variation of the prohibition against 
bills of attainder.242  This is an understanding of animus that is very much 
tied to Romer’s focus on the way in which Amendment 2 “singled out” gays 
and lesbians for disfavored treatment—a theme the Ninth Circuit then 
reiterated in Perry.243  But again, looking at other animus cases, it is 
apparent that this is a part, but not the whole, of animus.  For example, the 
City Council in Cleburne did not “single out” those with cognitive 
disabilities in the way that Amar describes.  Rather, the council applied an 
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existing discretionary framework with reference to private bias.244  The 
process flaw there was not the process of singling-out, but the reliance on 
private bias.  While the “singling-out” dynamic was arguably present in 
Moreno, Romer, Plyler, and Lawrence, it does not adequately explain what 
was impermissible about the laws in Palmore, Cleburne, Brown, Loving, 
and Zobel.  Taking into account all of these cases—from those in which 
state or private actors explicitly express hostility toward a particular group 
to those where a law appears to simply cordon off scarce resources on 
superficially reasonable grounds—what emerges is that animus is a type of 
impermissible objective function.  Specifically, animus is present where the 
public laws are harnessed to create and enforce distinctions between social 
groups—that is, groups of persons identified by status rather than conduct. 
There are strong policy considerations behind this understanding of 
animus.  First, such laws run counter to the meritocratic principles 
underlying the Equal Protection Clause, the Constitution generally, and 
American democracy as a whole.245  Second, per Brown and Loving, laws 
that perform this function always express an ideology of social group 
supremacy—something the Constitution does not permit.246  Third, the 
effect (intended or not) of such laws is to create permanent classes, or 
castes, which strikes at the heart of the fundamental and ambitious purpose 
of the Equal Protection Clause:  to eliminate all forms of class-based 
legislation.247 
B.  Evidence of Animus 
A related but distinct question is how, given the available precedent, 
plaintiffs can prove that a challenged law is based in unconstitutional 
animus.  The cases instruct that there are essentially two methods:  by 
pointing to direct evidence of private bias in the legislative record, or by 
supporting an inference of animus based on the structure of a law.248 
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no indication of animus in its legislative history, the democratic process has not failed). 
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The easy case is where the record presents direct evidence of private bias 
as the impetus behind adopting a law.249  Such statements may be made by 
legislators or private individuals and may express any number of sentiments 
that shed light on the true function of the law:  a mere recognition of the 
existence of private bias;250 an expression of bare moral disapproval;251 
and/or statements of stereotype or fear.252 
In terms of inferring animus based on the structure of the law, Cleburne 
provides the most compelling example.  In essence, the Court in Cleburne 
performed a sort of micro-suspect classification analysis to infer the 
presence of animus.  Traditional suspect classification analysis examines a 
number of factors, including whether:  (1) the group targeted by the 
classification is politically powerless; (2) that group has suffered a history 
of discrimination; (3) the characteristic defining the group is immutable; 
and (4) the characteristic is ever a valid consideration in legislative 
action.253  Based on a fact-intensive assessment of these various inherently 
changeable and backward-looking factors, the Court imposes a prospective 
presumption that laws relying on such classifications are suspect, and 
expresses this suspicion by applying heightened scrutiny in such cases. 
The analysis performed in Cleburne was a “micro” suspect classification 
analysis in that it did not seek to declare the classification suspect for all 
time (indeed, the Cleburne Court declined to designate persons with 
cognitive disabilities as a suspect class, largely because the defining trait 
would often be relevant to valid legislative goals),254 but instead looked at 
the validity of the classification in light of the interests at stake in that 
particular case.  In Cleburne, there was no affirmative connection between 
the trait of cognitive disability and either (1) the plaintiffs’ entitlement to 
generally available group housing, or (2) the government’s interest in 
regulating group housing.  In the absence of this type of logical connection, 
animus may be inferred.  This kind of analysis—which focuses closely on 
the nature of the trait being used—expresses a general skepticism of class-
based legislation, without reifying fixed “categories of concern” (suspect 
 
 249. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the 
law challenged in Moreno); supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text (discussing the same 
with respect to the law in Cleburne). 
 250. See supra notes 96–98, 103, 105 and accompanying text (describing the bias at issue 
in Palmore and the Supreme Court’s reaction to it). 
 251. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (discussing the role that moral 
disapproval played in Bowers). 
 252. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (“[M]ere 
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a 
zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded 
differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.”). 
 253. See Eskridge, supra note 247, at 10. 
 254. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (concluding that cognitive disability is not a suspect 
classification because “it is undeniable, and it is not argued otherwise here, that those who 
are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday 
world”). 
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classifications) and, by extension, categories of presumptive non-concern 
(non-suspect classifications). 
By contrast, the Court’s structural analysis of animus in Romer does not 
really hold water.  The Court in essence said that Amendment 2 must be 
based in animus because there was a radical lack of fit between the law’s 
means and ends—but this of course would mean that the law would fail 
standard rational basis review, making the Court’s conclusion regarding 
animus doctrinally gratuitous. 
As discussed above, the real story with Romer was that there was ample 
direct evidence of animus, but the Court could not invoke this evidence 
because Bowers was still good law when Romer was decided—and Bowers 
could certainly be read to authorize legislative disfavoring of sexual 
minorities.  Thus, the Romer Court instead characterized Amendment 2 as 
an impermissible “sort” of law invalidated by its structure, not by virtue of 
the fact that it expressed disapproval of sexual minorities.255   
Rather than provoking the Court to apply a form of heightened scrutiny, 
we can read the cases as providing plaintiffs with an opportunity to 
challenge rational basis review with affirmative evidence.  Specifically, the 
Court allows plaintiffs to affirmatively prove the presence of 
unconstitutional animus through close examination of the connection 
between the identifying trait and the interests—both individual and 
governmental—implicated by the law.  This understanding of 
unconstitutional animus and what it takes to prove its existence has several 
advantages from a doctrinal perspective.  First, it does not require proof of 
subjective intent along the lines of the discriminatory intent doctrine 
deployed in cases of nonfacial discrimination.  This is appropriate because 
the Equal Protection Clause demands heightened skepticism of laws 
containing facial classifications of persons; there is no reason to require that 
such classifications be invoked maliciously.  Second, it does not require 
judges to engage in the dangerous business of making broad assessments 
about the relative political power of particular groups, the degree of 
discrimination they have suffered, etc. (i.e., the factors of suspect 
classification analysis).  Such assessments are best avoided because they 
rest in the shifting sands of political and social reality and should not be 
cemented in precedent.  They also suggest that discrimination against some 
(non-suspect or quasi-suspect) social groups is permissible.  Further, there 
are serious questions about the extent to which courts are qualified to assess 
social reality in this fashion.  Finally, this understanding of unconstitutional 
animus gives life to the essential anti-caste mandate of the Equal Protection 
Clause, but in a way that is at once more concrete—because it is grounded 
in limited factual findings—and more flexible—because it involves a case-
 
 255. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (“It is not within our constitutional 
tradition to enact laws of this sort.”). 
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by-case assessment of the validity of all classifications of persons on the 
basis of status or identity (social group classifications) versus conduct.256 
C.  The Doctrinal Significance of Animus 
Finally, the Court’s animus jurisprudence to date has created 
considerable confusion over the doctrinal significance of a finding of 
animus.  Some cases suggest that while animus itself is not a legitimate 
state interest, the presence of other, credible legitimate state interests might 
save a law.  Theorists have offered that invoking animus is nothing more 
than a way for the Court to treat sexual orientation as a suspect 
classification without admitting that this is what it is doing.257  Perhaps the 
most mainstream theory of animus is that it is nothing more than a trigger 
for the mythical creature of “heightened rational basis review.”258  For 
example, in concurring with the outcome in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor 
characterized animus as “a desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” 
and asserted that in cases where animus was present, the Court had then 
“applied a more searching form of rational basis review.”259  Under this 
theory, the real doctrinal power of animus is that it triggers a form of 
heightened scrutiny. 
There are several problems with this approach.  First, like the “fit of 
spite” conception, it rests on an amorphous and incomplete understanding 
of animus.  Further, understanding animus as nothing more than a gateway 
to “heightened rational basis review” perpetuates the unjustified fixation on 
levels of scrutiny in equal protection jurisprudence.  As others have noted, 
this fixation on levels of scrutiny actually shortcuts nuanced, substantive 
assessment about what sort of laws are fair or unfair, and why.  In addition, 
the Court has never acknowledged that it applies “heightened rational basis 
review” in certain cases, and it is difficult to imagine the incentive for 
adding yet another level of scrutiny to an already dubious doctrinal 
taxonomy. 
 
 256. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2428–29 
(1994) (discussing the anticaste principle in relation to race and gender). 
 257. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY 
BILL OF RTS. J. 89, 93 (1997) (asserting that gays ought to be recognized as a suspect class 
but that Bowers v. Hardwick was “the principal doctrinal obstacle to this conclusion”). 
 258. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that the effect 
of a finding of animus was to trigger “a more searching form of rational basis review”); 
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1094 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’g Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-144 (U.S. July 30, 2012) 
(asserting that when legislation singles out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal 
status, even when analyzing the law under rational basis review, a court insists on knowing 
the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained, so that it may 
determine whether the law exists to further a proper legislative end or simply to put the class 
at a disadvantage); Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened 
Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1529 (2004). 
 259. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580. 
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Finally, this view is problematic because it suggests that a court could 
find that a law was based in animus, but nevertheless conclude that the law 
satisfied so-called “heightened rational basis review.”  This would put the 
courts in the position of validating laws animated by purpose fundamentally 
at odds with the values of the Equal Protection Clause. 
In reality, when the Court identifies evidence of animus, it discredits the 
other purported state interests, regardless of whether they are legitimate on 
a superficial level.  Thus, animus acts as a doctrinal silver bullet.  This is 
appropriate, because if animus is, indeed, constitutionally impermissible, no 
law found to be based in animus should be permitted to stand. 
IV.  ANIMUS GOING FORWARD 
The doctrine of unconstitutional animus has lain dormant in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence since its 1996 decision in Romer, but it appears 
primed to make an appearance.  In particular, animus has been discussed in 
a number of lower court cases dealing with the issue of same-sex 
marriage—most notably in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry, in which a 
certiorari petition is pending at the time of this writing.  If the Court grants 
certiorari in Perry, the Court will have the opportunity to make a critical 
pronouncement on animus.  If the Court denies certiorari in Perry, then the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of animus will likely be considered the 
authoritative interpretation by lower courts going forward.  And this is 
problematic, because the Ninth Circuits characterization of animus does not 
represent the totality of the doctrine as explored in the Supreme Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence.  In particular, the primary feature of the 
Ninth Circuit decision is that it grounds itself almost entirely in the doctrine 
of animus as articulated in Romer, which is not the most clear or the most 
vigorous of the Court’s animus cases.  As a result, Perry offers a rather thin 
understanding of animus that does not account for the larger animus 
tradition. 
Thus, the main risk the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry poses (a risk 
potentially exacerbated if the Supreme Court hears the case and affirms it 
on similar grounds) is that the Perry decision understands animus too 
narrowly, ignoring the more vigorous understanding of animus presented in 
the totality of the Supreme Court’s animus jurisprudence.260  The Ninth 
Circuit did not purport to present a comprehensive rule for animus; rather, it 
only sought to identify animus on the facts of the case before it.  But it is 
possible that state courts, lower federal courts, and the Supreme Court 
would reject other types of animus claims in future cases by distinguishing 
those cases from Perry.  And that would be wrong. 
 
 260. Indeed, a federal district court subsequently declined to apply the animus holding 
form Perry to the same-sex marriage ban before it, distinguishing Perry on its facts. See 
Jackson v. Abercrombie, No. 11-00734, 2012 WL 3255201, at *18–21 (D. Haw. Aug. 8, 
2012). 
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Unfortunately, this turn of events has already taken place.  A few months 
after Perry was issued, the federal district court in Hawaii issued its 
decision in Jackson v. Abercrombie.261  That case involved a challenge to 
Hawaii’s marriage laws, which provide reciprocal beneficiary benefits but 
purposefully exclude same-sex couples from the definition of marriage.  
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s clear statement that animus was not confined to 
“spite,” the federal district court in Hawaii read the Perry decision 
differently.  First, the court concluded that Perry was inapposite as a whole 
because Hawaii’s prohibition on same-sex marriage did not function to 
“take away” existing rights, as Proposition 8 did.262  Indeed, Hawaii had 
never granted marriage rights to same-sex couples, so there was nothing to 
take away.263  This factual difference between the challenged laws was 
sufficient to make the Perry decision irrelevant. 
Second, the district court determined that Romer also did not apply 
because, while Amendment 2 was concededly a law “of unusual character,” 
this could not be said of Hawaii’s same-sex marriage ban, as such bans 
were widespread and typical: 
In Romer, the Supreme Court explained that the “disqualification of a 
class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law 
[was] unprecedented.”  The Supreme Court found the absence of 
precedent for Amendment 2 instructive; “[d]iscriminations of an unusual 
character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether 
they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.”  Here, in contrast, the 
definition of marriage as a union between a man and woman is not 
without precedent or unusual.  In fact, it is the historically and 
traditionally understood definition; while marriages between same-sex 
couples was first allowed by a state in 2004 and since then, only by a 
minority of states.264 
The district court did not consider other aspects of the animus doctrine, or 
the articulation of animus in other cases.  Further, the court insinuated that 
it would find animus only in cases where the legislature or the populace 
acted “absurdly, ignorantly, or with bigotry”265—a contention that directly 
conflicts with Perry’s instruction (based on the Supreme Court’s own 
animus jurisprudence) that animus can be grounded in much milder 
sentiments, including stereotype and disapproval.266 
 
 261. See id. at *18–21. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at *22. 
 264. Id. (citations omitted).  This is a good demonstration of why the Romer rule is so 
weak.  It assesses animus by reference to convention—it is not a powerful tool in identifying 
contemporary prejudices. 
 265. Id. 
 266. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1094 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’g Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-144 
(U.S. July 30, 2012) (noting “[t]he ‘inference’ that Proposition 8 was born of disapproval of 
gays and lesbians is heightened by evidence of the context in which the measure was passed” 
such as the district court’s finding “that ‘[t]he campaign to pass Proposition 8 relied on 
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A.  Animus and the Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Perry 
The Ninth Circuit repeatedly emphasized that it was addressing a narrow 
issue in its decision:  whether the Equal Protection Clause permitted a state 
(here represented by the people operating through the referendum process) 
to enact a law the sole purpose of which was to deprive a designated group 
of rights that they previously possessed.267  The court bluntly stated that it 
was not deciding the broader question of whether states could bar same-sex 
couples from marriage in other ways without running afoul of federal equal 
protection principles.268 
There are good reasons why the Ninth Circuit decided Perry on narrow 
grounds.269  First, limiting the decision to the particular facts presented in 
California arguably made the decision irrelevant to other jurisdictions, 
decreasing the chance that the United States Supreme Court would grant 
certiorari review.  Second, by limiting the implications of the decision, the 
Ninth Circuit panel also may have lessened the chances of reversal were the 
Court to grant cert.  Third, and most appropriate, confining the decision to 
the narrowest possible grounds was an act of judicial restraint. 
But resting the decision on narrow legal and factual grounds did not 
necessarily require the Ninth Circuit to articulate such an excessively 
narrow view of the doctrine of unconstitutional animus.  The court could 
have acknowledged that animus could be found in other types of laws, 
while emphasizing that the extraordinary legal mechanism before it was a 
clear example of such impermissible laws. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is a case study in the rhetoric of judicial 
constraint, which was motivated by several factors.  The first form of 
constraint was the necessity of framing the issue before the court as 
narrowly as possible, in recognition of the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance.  The court was further constrained by the state supreme court’s 
factual findings regarding the nature, scope, and effect of Proposition 8.  In 
addition, the Ninth Circuit was constrained by the federal district court’s 
findings of fact, which the appellate court could reconsider only in the case 
of clear error.  Finally, the court was also constrained by Supreme Court 
precedent—most significantly, the Court’s decision in Romer. 
The Ninth Circuit’s devotion to Romer is problematic because, as 
demonstrated above, Romer is the most compromised and unhelpful of the 
Court’s animus cases.  The Romer Court presumably could have relied on 
direct evidence of private biases, and could have invalidated Amendment 2 
 
stereotypes to show that same-sex relationships are inferior to opposite-sex relationships.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 267. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1064. 
 268. Id. at 1083. 
 269. See William Eskridge, The Ninth Circuit’s Perry Decision and the Constitutional 
Politics of Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93 (2012) (crediting the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Perry as conforming with ideals of judicial minimalism and respect for 
the democratic evolution of views on same-sex marriage). 
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on that basis, a la Palmore.  But because Bowers emphatically stood for the 
proposition that stigmatizing gays was acceptable, Romer drew attention 
away from this substantive objection and instead inferred animus from a 
dubious structural analysis. 
Thus, in mimicking Romer, the Ninth Circuit’s first step in addressing the 
animus argument was to carefully describe the precise effect of the 
challenged law.270  Why?  Because of the various ways one might describe 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Romer, it is at heart a structural analysis of 
unconstitutional animus.  That is, the Romer Court looked to the structure 
rather than the content of the challenged law to infer that it was based on 
animus.  Specifically, the Romer Court focused on the relationship between 
the broad rights-deprivation worked by Colorado’s Amendment 2 and the 
relatively flimsy justifications offered for the law.  And the Ninth Circuit 
conducted this same kind of analysis. 
As discussed above, the exact scope and impact of Proposition 8 were 
issues that neither the Ninth Circuit nor the federal district court had to 
decide.  This is because the California Supreme Court had authoritatively 
interpreted the question back in 2009.  Nonetheless, when restating that 
holding and further characterizing the law, the Ninth Circuit chose its words 
carefully.  Most dramatically, Proposition 8 “stripped”271 same-sex couples 
of the marriage right; it “deprived,”272 “eliminat[ed],”273 “took . . . 
away,”274 “excise[d],” 275“den[ied]”276 and “withdr[ew].”277  As with 
Colorado’s Amendment 2, the proponents of Proposition 8 contended that 
the law did not deprive the targeted group of rights, but merely restored the 
status quo.  In Perry, as in Romer, showing how the law actively deprived 
individuals of rights they previously enjoyed was critical to contending that 
this rights-deprivation was not justified. 
The relevant inquiry in Romer was not whether the state of the law after 
Amendment 2 was constitutional; there was no doubt that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not require antidiscrimination protections to be afforded to 
gays and lesbians.  The question, instead, was whether the change in the 
law that Amendment 2 effected could be justified by some legitimate 
purpose.278 
In addition to demonstrating that Proposition 8 worked an affirmative 
and dramatic change in legal rights, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the law’s 
focus on depriving same-sex couples of the symbolic meaning and social 
 
 270. See id. at 1076–82. 
 271. Id. at 1063. 
 272. Id. at 1082. 
 273. Id. at 1069 n.4. 
 274. Id. at 1077. 
 275. Id. at 1081. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 1083 (emphasis omitted). 
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status associated with the term “marriage.”279  The court pointed to all of 
the marriage-like rights that same-sex couples retained after the passage of 
Proposition 8—rights related to children, medical decisions, and joint 
property.280  Thus, what Proposition 8 accomplished was exceedingly 
narrow, but not insignificant, because of the profound and unique meaning 
of the word and designation, “marriage.”281  By emphasizing that extremely 
limited scope of Proposition 8, the Ninth Circuit departed from the Supreme 
Court’s approach in Romer, which emphasized the broad impact of 
Colorado’s Amendment 2.  But the Ninth Circuit explained that both 
modalities—deprivation of a broad swath of rights and extremely targeted 
denial of a highly cherished right—served to arouse suspicions that the law 
was “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”282 
Having characterized the impact of Proposition 8, the Ninth Circuit went 
on to discuss the Romer decision at some length, and then examined the 
similarities and differences between the laws at issue in each case.  The 
primary similarity between the two laws is that they singled out a particular 
group and denied to that group rights that were broadly available to 
others.283  The laws did not reflect real differences; rather, they created 
class distinctions by placing the targeted group “in a solitary class” with 
respect to important rights.284  Further, this act of purposeful differentiation 
was enshrined in legal bedrock:  the state constitution. 
The court emphasized that it was not that states could never take away 
rights once granted, but that “the Equal Protection Clause requires the state 
to have a legitimate reason for withdrawing a right or benefit from one 
group but not others.”285  Here, the court appropriately drew an analogy to 
Moreno.  Surely the “hippies” targeted in that case had no general right to 
demand food stamp entitlements, but once included in the scope of the 
legislation, the government had to give a reason for then deciding to 
purposefully exclude the group.  The idea is that while the government need 
not extend certain benefits to unpopular groups in the first place, the law 
may not be used as a vehicle for retribution against such groups. 
Having concluded that the fundamental mechanism of Proposition 8 
supported an inference of animus, the Ninth Circuit next examined 
whether a legitimate interest exists that justifies the People of California’s 
action in taking away from same-sex couples the right to use the official 
designation and enjoy the status of “marriage”—a legitimate interest that 
 
 279. Id. at 1092. 
 280. Id. at 1077. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 1080. 
 283. See id. at 1080–81. 
 284. Id. at 1081. 
 285. Id. at 1083–84. 
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suffices to overcome the “inevitable inference” of animus to which 
Proposition 8’s discriminatory effects otherwise give rise.286 
The court found the proffered interests lacking.287 
The court then went on to consider whether there might be other bases on 
which Californians had enacted the law.  The court noted that the law 
functioned to preserve tradition (i.e., the tradition of exclusively 
heterosexual marriage), but that “tradition alone is not a justification for 
taking away a right that had already been granted.”288 
Concluding that there was no independent legitimate interest that 
Proposition 8 served, the court returned to “the inevitable inference that the 
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward” or even mere 
disapproval of the targeted group.289  Here the court emphasized that it need 
not conclude that people of California operated on the basis of ill will or 
spite.  Indeed, animus of the type discussed here really means “[p]rejudice,” 
which “rises not from malice or hostile animus alone.”290  In a similar vein, 
the court noted that unconstitutional animus does not necessarily mean a 
“desire to harm”—“basic disapproval of a class of people” is sufficient.291 
The court emphasized that the disapproval expressed by Proposition 8 
was “of gays and lesbians as a class.”292  The court thereby drew on a 
status-conduct distinction:  “It will not do to say that Proposition 8 was 
intended only to disapprove of same-sex marriage, rather than to pass 
judgment on same-sex couples as people.”293  In brief, private individuals 
are free to disapprove of classes of persons because of who they are, but 
they cannot use the public laws to enforce and express such disapproval. 
It was not until the last few pages of the opinion that the court addressed 
the abundant direct record evidence of unconstitutional animus surrounding 
the Proposition 8 campaign.  The court concluded by responding to Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Romer, ruling that the plaintiffs here did not need to 
prove that the People of California passed Proposition 8 out of a “fit of 
 
 286. Id. at 1085. 
 287. In keeping with its practice of avoiding controversial questions where possible, the 
Ninth Circuit declined to directly address whether “protecting religious liberty” was 
substantively a legitimate state interest, as opposed to just another name for impermissible 
private bias.  The court again turned to the tailoring prong of rational basis review and 
concluded that there was no evidence that religious liberty was threatened before the passage 
of Proposition 8 or protected after its enactment. Id. at 1091–92. 
 288. Id. at 1092 (emphasis omitted).  Again, focus on withdrawing previously granted 
rights seems excessive and possibly limiting.  Tradition did not validate antimiscegenation 
laws in Loving, despite the fact that the law in Virginia had never affirmatively conferred a 
right to interracial marriage.  Similarly, preserving tradition was deemed an insufficient basis 
for legislation in Lawrence v. Texas, where, again, there was no reversal of rights as 
presented in the Perry case.  The Perry decision cites both of these cases. See id. at 1093. 
 289. Id. at 1080. 
 290. Id. at 1093 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 
(2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 291. Id. at 1094. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 1093. 
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spite.”294  Rather, “[i]t is enough to say that Proposition 8 operates with no 
apparent purpose but to impose on gays and lesbians, through the public 
law, a majority’s private disapproval of them.”295 
The substantive outcome of the court’s analysis was to suspect the 
presence of animus where a law took away rights that had previously been 
granted, thus focusing on (and seemingly requiring) a change in the law 
over time.  Once this suspicion was raised, the court then demanded that the 
governmental interests purportedly served by the law justify not just 
reliance on the subject classification (the usual tailoring inquiry under 
rational basis review), but the rights deprivation itself.296  This approach to 
the animus analysis is interesting, but it hangs other animus cases out to 
dry.  Given that Proposition 8 (1) objectively functioned to differentially 
distribute legal rights among social groups, and (2) was enacted in a cloud 
of antigay bias, it should have been easy for the Ninth Circuit, following 
Cleburne, to identify unconstitutional animus. 
B.  The Next Cases 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry accords with much of the Supreme 
Court’s animus jurisprudence, but it overanalyzes what is really a very 
clear-cut case of direct evidence of animus.  In other words, the abundant 
evidence of antigay sentiment surrounding the campaign for Proposition 8 
should have sufficed to prove that the law was based on unconstitutional 
animus (as in Moreno, Palmore and Cleburne). 
The court arguably took this indirect route because of its excessive 
reliance on Romer, which is the most compromised and constrained animus 
case decided by the Supreme Court for the reasons cited above.  Because 
Bowers was still good law at the time Romer was decided, Romer could not 
come out and say that antigay bias in particular was impermissible.  Rather, 
Romer made much vaguer assertions about the impermissibility of certain 
types of laws, and then fit Amendment 2 into that ill-defined category.  
Romer was rightly decided, but it would have been decided through 
different reasoning had it been decided after Lawrence. 
It is important to recognize the limited understanding of animus that 
Perry illustrates, because this limited understanding will not provide proper 
guidance in the same-sex marriage cases set in a different factual posture 
than Perry.  Perry essentially understands animus as the granting and 
subsequent withdrawal of a right; and while this does seem to be evidence 
clearly supporting an inference of animus, this type of evidence will not 
necessarily be present in cases arising from other jurisdictions.  However, 
this is not of great concern to potential litigants, because such evidence is 
 
 294. Id. at 1095. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 1093–94. 
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not required.  All that is required is the type of affirmative evidence of 
private bias that was present in Moreno, Palmore, Cleburne and Lawrence. 
CONCLUSION 
Animus means not only “hostility,” but also “animating spirit.”  We see 
that the Supreme Court’s animus jurisprudence patrols all state action 
relying on status-based classifications for an impermissible animating spirit.  
This general suspicion of class-based legislation has been somewhat lost in 
the Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny framework.  In particular, many of the 
foundational cases in equal protection jurisprudence exhibit a profound 
suspicion of class-based legislation, especially where such classifications 
tend to create or enforce castes—legally sanctioned differences between 
social groups.  But the Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny framework subjects the 
majority of class-based legislation to the minimal scrutiny associated with 
rational basis review, gutting the principled and ambitious political vision 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
In contrast to the rigid, backward-looking suspect classification inquiry, 
the animus inquiry is flexible and responsive to contemporary prejudices.  It 
provides meaningful review of laws that do not implicate established 
suspect and quasi-suspect classifications.  Probably the best example is 
found in Moreno.  The targets of congressional ill will in that case were 
“hippies”—a group that did not bear any of the indicia of a classic suspect 
classification and a group which many would argue were justifiably 
marginalized due to their belief system and lifestyle.  This did not mean, 
however, that it was permissible to use the law to permanently enshrine that 
social marginalization.  Laws that tend to create a caste society degrade our 
democracy and all of us. 
This conception of animus is powerful because it takes us away from 
making tenuous social judgments about whether certain groups are 
sufficiently marginalized to merit special consideration under the Equal 
Protection Clause, or whether the marginalization of a group is justified.  
Instead, the animus inquiry asks whether a law impermissibly gives effect 
to—indeed, expresses—stereotypes or biases about a particular social group 
based on that group’s status or associations rather than individual conduct.  
The question in an animus case is not whether the animus is justified; it is 
merely whether animus exists. 
